G.R. No. L-13899; September 29, 1961
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO BLAZA and FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, defendants, FRANCISCO MANGULABNAN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Defendant-appellant Francisco Mangulabnan, along with Pablo Blaza, was charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code for the abduction of Dorotea Fernandez, Fe Fernandez, and Buenaventura Fernandez on April 23, 1953. Prior to trial, Mangulabnan filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that he was already charged with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders, robberies, arsons, and kidnapping in a separate case (Criminal Case No. 1940) before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. He contended that the kidnapping, being allegedly committed to raise funds for the Hukbalahap (HMB) organization, was a necessary means and in furtherance of rebellion. Citing the Hernandez doctrine, he asserted that such acts are absorbed by the crime of rebellion and that prosecuting him separately for kidnapping would place him in double jeopardy.
The trial court denied the motion to quash and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The case proceeded to trial, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna found Mangulabnan guilty as charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed the judgment, reiterating his claim that the kidnapping charge was absorbed in the rebellion case and that his prosecution for kidnapping constituted double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the separate prosecution and conviction of Francisco Mangulabnan for the crime of kidnapping for ransom places him in double jeopardy, considering his pending charge for rebellion which allegedly includes the same kidnapping act as an overt act.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that no double jeopardy existed. The legal logic is grounded on the specific allegations in the informations and the application of the Hernandez doctrine. For the doctrine of absorption of common crimes by rebellion to apply, the specific common crime must be alleged in the information for rebellion as one of its constituent acts. A scrutiny of the information in the Pampanga rebellion case (Criminal Case No. 1940) revealed that the kidnapping of the Fernandez family on April 23, 1953, was never mentioned or incorporated as an overt act of the rebellion charged. Furthermore, in a related Laguna rebellion case (Criminal Case No. 15909) where the same kidnapping was discussed, Mangulabnan was not even a defendant. Consequently, he had never been placed in jeopardy of punishment for rebellion for that specific kidnapping act.
Since the kidnapping was not alleged as part of the rebellion charge against him, it remained a distinct and separate offense. The Court cited its precedent in People vs. Abesamis, involving Mangulabnan’s confederates for the same kidnapping incident, where it was established that the act was committed by Huks under command. In that case, the Court sustained the separate conviction for kidnapping for ransom, imposing reclusion perpetua. The same penalty was deemed applicable to Mangulabnan. Therefore, his prosecution and conviction for kidnapping for ransom under a separate information did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.