GR L 1384; (October, 1903) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-1384 : October 29, 1903
THE CALIFORNIA MANILA LUMBER COMMERCIAL COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE GARCHITORENA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The plaintiff filed an action to recover 1,192 pesos from the defendant for lumber furnished. The defendant filed a general denial. On the day of trial, April 6, 1903, the defendant failed to appear. The court proceeded with the trial, received the plaintiff’s evidence, and on the same day rendered judgment against the defendant for the amount claimed. On April 14, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment, alleging (1) that his lawyer was not notified of the trial date due to the neglect of another lawyer, and (2) that there was an agreement with the plaintiff’s lawyer to settle the case out of court. The plaintiff’s lawyer denied any such settlement agreement in an affidavit. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment on April 21. The defendant excepted to this order.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Supreme Court can review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the trial.
2. Whether the trial court committed a reversible error or abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment.
RULING:
1. On the sufficiency of the evidence: The Supreme Court held that it could not review the questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. The bill of exceptions did not contain any of the evidence presented at the trial, and there was no motion for a new trial on the ground that the decision was not justified by the evidence. Under Section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court was prohibited from deciding such questions.
2. On the denial of the motion to set aside the judgment: The Court noted that under Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order granting or denying a motion to set aside a judgment cannot be made the subject of an exception. Assuming, without deciding, that the Court had the power to review an alleged abuse of discretion, it found no such abuse in this case. The trial court’s denial of the motion was therefore proper.
The judgment of the trial court was AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellant.