G.R. No. L-13715, December 23, 1959
FELIX V. VALENCIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Felix V. Valencia was formerly the general superintendent of defendant Cebu Portland Cement Company. His separation from service on June 16, 1950, was previously adjudicated in G.R. No. L-6158 (March 11, 1954), wherein the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), affirmed by the Supreme Court, held his removal from May 1, 1949, to November 16, 1950, to be unjustifiable and ordered his reinstatement with back wages and emoluments for that period. On June 22, 1956, Valencia filed the present complaint against the company and other defendants, alleging that his dismissal was caused by their concerted, malicious, illegal, unjust, oppressive, and high-handed acts, resulting in humiliation and irreparable injury to his and his family’s reputation, honor, and social standing. He sought actual/compensatory damages, exemplary damages, nominal/temperate damages, attorney’s fees, and contingent fees totaling P299,509.00. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint on the grounds of res judicata (bar by prior judgment) and prescription (statute of limitations).

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint on the grounds of (1) res judicata (bar by prior judgment) and (2) prescription under the statute of limitations.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
1. On Res Judicata: The Court held that the present action for damages arising from Valencia’s illegal dismissal is barred by the prior judgment in G.R. No. L-6158. The removal of Valencia, which was declared illegal by the CIR and affirmed by the Supreme Court, is the very same cause or reason for the present damages claim. Under Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a party cannot split a single cause of action into multiple suits. Valencia should have included his claim for damages in the earlier industrial case seeking reinstatement. A party cannot, in a subsequent proceeding, recover other damages or remedies to which he was entitled in the former action based on the same unlawful dismissal.
2. On Prescription: The Court ruled that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The cause of action for damages arose from Valencia’s separation from service on November 16, 1950. The complaint was filed only on June 22, 1956, which is beyond the four-year prescriptive period for actions “upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff” under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The Court rejected Valencia’s argument that the action was based on a former judgment, clarifying that the prior judgment merely declared his separation illegal and ordered payment of his salaries and emoluments for a specific period. Any claim for additional injury caused by the illegal acts leading to his dismissal on November 16, 1950, should have been filed within four years from that date.
The decision of the lower court was affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.