G.R. No. L-13692; July 31, 1959
Cayetano Jordas, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Salomon Vedad, et al., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint to quiet title to a parcel of land. After the defendant Salomon Vedad answered on September 3, 1951, asserting ownership, the case underwent numerous postponements. The plaintiffs moved for postponement on multiple occasions: November 28, 1951; December 31, 1952 (for a January 13, 1953 hearing); February 18, 1953 (for a February 25, 1953 hearing); October 7, 1953; August 12, 1954; and October 23, 1954. A hearing was held on March 12, 1953, but upon plaintiffs’ motion, a commissioner was appointed to verify the property. The court granted a preliminary injunction on February 2, 1955. On September 21, 1955, the court initially dismissed the case for plaintiffs’ failure to appear but reconsidered on October 3, 1955, setting the hearing for October 27, 1955. Plaintiffs again moved for postponement on October 23, 1955, and the hearing was reset to January 4, 5, and 6, 1956. On December 28, 1955, plaintiffs’ counsel moved for a continuance. This motion was denied, and when plaintiffs failed to appear on January 4, 1956, the court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to appear at the trial and for neglect to prosecute their action for an unreasonable length of time under Rule 30, section 3 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes, the dismissal was justified. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The case had been pending for over four years, with the trial postponed nine times at the plaintiffs’ request. The plaintiffs’ repeated requests for postponement, coupled with their failure to appear at the trial, demonstrated a lack of interest in prosecuting their action, an absence of proofs to support it, or a desire to harass the defendants. The Court noted the issuance of a preliminary injunction indicated the matter’s urgency. The plaintiffs’ argument that they were entitled to notice of the denial of their last motion for postponement (filed on December 28, 1955) was unavailing. Given the intervening holidays (Rizal Day on December 30, and holidays on December 31 and January 2), there were only two working days available for the court to act on the motion and provide notice before the January 4, 1956 hearing. The dismissal was based not merely on the failure to appear but principally on the unreasonable delay caused by the plaintiffs. The order of dismissal is affirmed with double costs against the appellants.