G.R. No. 13669 ; October 25, 1918
RAM SINGH, DHAN SINGH, CHOLA SINGH, CHANDA SINGH, JAGJIT SINGH, PALA SINGH, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
The plaintiffs-appellants, all East Indians from the Punjab region of India, arrived at the port of Manila on May 8, 1917, aboard the steamship Yuen Sang and sought permission to enter the Philippine Islands. A board of special inquiry of the Bureau of Customs denied their entry, finding them ineligible under Section 3 of the U.S. Act of Congress of February 5, 1917 (the Immigration Act of 1917). Their appeal to the Collector of Customs was affirmed, and a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila was denied. The appellants then elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The appellants were variously described as farmers, peddlers, and night watchmen, with only one (Pala Singh) having previously resided in the Philippines (from 1907 to 1912).

ISSUE:
Whether the appellants are entitled to enter the territory of the United States (including the Philippine Islands) under Section 3 of the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The appellants were not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands under the Immigration Act of 1917.

1. On Treaty Relations: The appellants argued that treaty relations between the United States and Great Britain entitled them to enter. The Court held that any such treaty relations would be between the U.S. and Great Britain, not directly with inhabitants of British India. Furthermore, existing treaties with Great Britain expressly applied only to British subjects in Europe, not India. Critically, even if a relevant treaty existed, the later-enacted Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, would control in case of inconsistency, as a treaty and a statute have equal standing as supreme law, and the later in time prevails.

2. On Status as Merchants: The appellants claimed they were “merchants,” a class exempted from the immigration ban under the Act. The Court rejected this, noting the Act provided no definition of “merchant” and thus applied the general legal definition. The appellants admitted they were peddlers and night watchmen. A peddler is an itinerant trader without a fixed place of business, whereas a merchant is engaged in buying and selling at a fixed establishment. Therefore, the appellants did not qualify as merchants under the exempted class.

3. On Jurisdiction of the Board of Special Inquiry: The appellants contested the board’s authority to exclude them. The Court upheld the board’s jurisdiction, citing Section 1 of the Act, which mandated its enforcement in the Philippines by the Insular Government. The Bureau of Customs, through its established machinery (including the board of special inquiry), was the proper agency to enforce the alien exclusion laws, as consistently held in prior jurisprudence.

The appellants, as natives of a territory within the “barred zone” defined in Section 3 of the Act and not falling within any of the exempted classes, were properly excluded. They were ordered remanded to the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs for deportation.