GR L 13669; (October, 1918) (CRITIQUE)
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THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The court’s reliance on Whitney v. Robertson and the last-in-time rule is legally sound, as it correctly prioritizes the 1917 Act of Congress over any prior treaty, especially given the Act’s explicit territorial exclusion. However, the opinion’s summary dismissal of the treaty argument is overly cursory. While the court notes the treaty’s limitation to “subjects in Europe,” a more rigorous analysis of the treaty’s text and the principle of territorial sovereignty would have strengthened the holding. The court’s swift conclusion that “whatever treaty relations exist… must be between the Government of the United States and Great Britain” implicitly rejects any individual rights under the treaty, a position consistent with contemporary doctrine but stated without the nuanced discussion found in Foster & Elam v. Neilson regarding self-executing treaties.

The court’s application of the statutory “merchant” exception is critically flawed. By accepting a “general definition” that categorically excludes peddlers and night watchmen, the court engages in an arbitrary classification without examining the appellants’ specific commercial activities or the legislative intent behind the exception. This rigid, definitional approach substitutes for a substantive inquiry into whether the appellants’ occupations involved trade or commerce at a level Congress intended to exempt. The decision thus elevates a formalistic label over a functional analysis, creating a risk of capricious exclusion based on occupational title rather than actual economic role, which contradicts the interpretive principle to construe immigration statutes narrowly in favor of the individual when ambiguity exists.

Ultimately, the decision exemplifies the plenary power doctrine in immigration, where judicial review is severely constrained. The court defers entirely to the executive’s factual determination through the Board of Special Inquiry, refusing to re-weigh evidence on the appellants’ status. While this deference was standard, the opinion fails to articulate any standard for reviewing whether the board’s conclusion was supported by “some evidence” or was procedurally fair, a developing requirement even then. The holding rests on a mechanistic application of the geographic ban and occupational exceptions, treating the appellants as a monolithic class from a prohibited zone rather than individuals with distinct claims. This approach, while expedient, underscores the era’s jurisprudence where exclusionary statutes were applied with minimal scrutiny, often at the expense of equitable consideration.