G.R. No. L-13408; September 24, 1959
IN RE: PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION. LO KIO alias ANTONIO MANLY, petitioner and appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.

FACTS

On June 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur denied the petition for naturalization filed by Lo Kio alias Antonio Manly. The denial was based solely on the ground that the petitioner did not possess the good moral character required under the Revised Naturalization Law. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting this appeal. The facts reveal that during his first visit to China in 1931, the petitioner married a Chinese woman named Tan Eng, with whom he had a son. He returned to the Philippines in 1932, leaving his wife in China, where she died in 1941 (a fact he learned only in 1949). From 1941 to 1952, he cohabited with Luisa Alejo in the Philippines, and they had four children together. He finally married Luisa Alejo on September 9, 1952.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner possesses the good moral character required for naturalization, considering his period of cohabitation without marriage and his failure to fulfill certain statutory requirements regarding his minor child.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision denying the petition for naturalization. The Court held that the petitioner’s subsequent marriage to Luisa Alejo in 1952 did not cure his lack of good moral character. Citing the precedent in Sy Kiam vs. Republic, the Court ruled that cohabiting with a woman and begetting children without the benefit of marriage constitutes conduct that is not “proper and irreproachable” as required by the naturalization law. The Court emphasized that such behavior falls short of the moral standards demanded for admission to Philippine citizenship.
Additionally, the Court found another ground for denial. It noted that five years prior to filing his petition in 1954, the petitioner’s son in China was a minor of school age (16 years old in 1949). The petitioner failed to show any effort to bring his son to the Philippines to enroll him in schools as required by Paragraph 6, Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. The mere fact that the child was in China did not, without a justifiable reason, excuse the petitioner from this statutory obligation. Citing several precedents (Dy Chan Tiao vs. Republic, Yap Chin vs. Republic, etc.), the Court held this failure to be a disqualification.
Therefore, the decision appealed from was affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.