G.R. No. L-1335; July 30, 1947
CECILIO BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. EMILIO PEÑA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Cecilio Buenaventura, was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 971 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. He sought a judicial declaration of his right to occupy and lease Stalls Nos. 1162 and 1495 of the Quinta Market and an order restraining the defendants (including Mayor Valeriano Fugoso and Domingo Coquiat) from ousting him. The respondent judge, Emilio Peña, issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants. After trial, the judge rendered a decision declaring respondent Domingo Coquiat to be the lawful occupant of the stalls and setting aside the preliminary injunction. The petitioner appealed this decision. Before the period for appeal expired, Coquiat filed an urgent motion for execution of the judgment, arguing that he had long been deprived of the stalls (his only means of support) and that Buenaventura, who had several other stalls, was unjustly enriching himself at Coquiat’s expense. The respondent judge granted the motion for immediate execution by writing “Motion granted” on the motion itself. Buenaventura then filed this petition for certiorari, contending the order for immediate execution constituted a grave abuse of discretion due to a lack of good reasons.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate execution of the judgment prior to the expiration of the appeal period.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction it had issued. The Court held that the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
1. On Discretion to Order Execution: Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a trial court may, in its discretion, order execution before the expiration of the time to appeal upon good reasons stated in a special order. The sufficiency of the reasons is within the trial court’s discretion, and the Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment unless there is an abuse of that discretion. The Court found that the reasons stated in Coquiat’s motion—his prolonged deprivation of possession and the daily loss of benefits from the stalls—constituted “good reasons” for ordering immediate execution, regardless of the lack of a finding on damages in the main decision.
2. On Effect of Dissolving the Injunction: Furthermore, the decision in the civil case had set aside the preliminary injunction. Under Section 4, Rule 39, a judgment dissolving an injunction is not stayed after rendition and before or during an appeal, unless the trial court orders otherwise. Since the respondent judge did not restore the injunction and instead ordered execution, the city officials were authorized to carry out the ouster. The Court noted that the execution order essentially authorized the city authorities, with the sheriff’s aid, to effect the ouster, which was a logical consequence of the judgment determining Coquiat’s better title.
DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Perfecto):
Justice Perfecto dissented, arguing that the order for execution clearly violated Section 2, Rule 39, which requires “good reasons to be stated in a special order.” The respondent judge’s two-word notation, “Motion granted,” written on the motion itself, stated no reasons at all. This violation of law was, in his view, sufficient ground to set aside the execution order.