GR L 13334; (March, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-13334; April 29, 1960
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO M. DURAN, JR., alias Potoy, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On June 4, 1956, a complaint for Serious Slander by Deed was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Balangiga, Samar, against Pedro M. Duran, Jr., the municipal mayor. The complaint alleged that on April 16, 1956, during a council meeting at the municipal building, Duran willfully slapped or boxed Municipal Councilor Ignacio A. Amarillo on the left shoulder in the presence of many people. The accused waived preliminary investigation, and the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Samar, where an information was filed on October 19, 1956, reiterating the charge and specifying that Duran acted with deliberate intent to bring dishonor, taking advantage of his official position as mayor. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CFI, however, dismissed the case on a different ground: it ruled it lacked jurisdiction because the serious slander by deed charged did not impute any crime and the complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by the offended party himself, as allegedly required by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution appealed this order of dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the information for serious slander by deed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the complaint not being filed by the offended party.
RULING
No, the dismissal was erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the lower court’s reliance on the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code was misplaced. That provision requires a complaint by the offended party only for defamation that imputes a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio (i.e., adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness under Article 344). Since the grave slander by deed charged in this case did not impute any crime, public or private, to the offended party, a complaint by the offended party was not necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The doctrines from U.S. vs. De la Cruz and People vs. Martinez, which required a complaint by the offended party for all injuria against private persons, were based on a repealed law ( Act No. 1773 ) and have been overruled.
However, despite the erroneous dismissal, the Supreme Court could not remedy the error because an appeal by the government would place the accused in double jeopardy. The rule is that when a trial court with jurisdiction mistakenly dismisses a case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the order is unappealable as it would constitute a second jeopardy for the same offense. The exception—where the accused consents to the dismissal—did not apply because the accused’s motion to dismiss was based on failure of proof, not lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.