G.R. No. L-1329; May 15, 1947
RAMCAR, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. DIONISIO DE LEON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On December 26, 1946, petitioner Ramcar, Inc. filed a civil complaint for damages against Daniel Francisco, Ulysses S. Tread, Jr., and Antonio Lloret in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that the defendants stole and dismantled the petitioner’s taxicab, making it a total loss. The petitioner prayed for payment of the car’s value, a reward offered for its recovery, lost income, and costs. It also sought a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants’ properties, alleging they were concealing or disposing of them to defraud creditors. On January 2, 1947, after the petitioner filed a bond, the court issued the writ of attachment. However, on December 28, 1946, an information for theft based on the same facts had already been filed against the same defendants in a criminal case. Subsequently, the defendants moved to dissolve the writ of attachment. The respondent judge granted these motions and set aside the writ, based on his interpretation of Rule 107, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Court. The judge held that since the criminal action had already been commenced, the civil action could not be prosecuted and, therefore, the writ of attachment (an ancillary process in the civil case) was improperly issued. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this petition to declare the judge’s orders null and void and to reinstate the writ of attachment.

ISSUE

Whether a writ of preliminary attachment can be validly issued in a civil action for damages arising from an offense after a criminal action based on the same offense has already been commenced, thereby causing the civil action to be suspended under Rule 107, Section 1(c).

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring the respondent judge’s orders null and void and reinstating the writ of attachment. The Court held that the suspension of a civil action under Rule 107, Section 1(c) upon the commencement of a criminal action does not deprive the court of the power to issue ancillary writs, such as preliminary attachment, during the suspension period. The Court reasoned that suspension is not termination; the civil action remains alive but its progression to trial on the merits is temporarily halted. To deny the availability of ancillary processes during suspension would effectively cripple the civil action and defeat the purpose of the law, which is to guarantee the offended party’s right to recover civil liability. The Court further noted that when a civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action (as per Rule 107, Section 1(a)), the offended party may obtain a preliminary attachment within the criminal proceedings. There is no logical reason to deny that same right when the civil action is separately instituted but suspended. The respondent judge’s orders were based on a wrong interpretation of the rule.