GR L 13272; (December, 1959) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-13272, December 26, 1959
Trinidad Ocampo-Cañiza, petitioner, vs. Hon. Felix Martinez, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Trinidad Ocampo-Cañiza filed an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 19123) against Apolinario Velasco in the Municipal Court of Manila, which ruled in her favor, ordering Velasco to pay back rentals and vacate the premises. The Municipal Court granted her motion for immediate execution. Velasco appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) and was granted time to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution, but he failed to file it within the period. Consequently, the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution, and possession of the property was restored to Ocampo-Cañiza. However, before the records were elevated to the CFI, Velasco filed a supersedeas bond, which the Municipal Court approved. Relying on this bond, Velasco petitioned the CFI to restore his possession, and the CFI ordered the Sheriff to do so. Ocampo-Cañiza challenged this CFI order via certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), which issued a preliminary injunction. The CFI later decided the appealed case in favor of Ocampo-Cañiza, ordering Velasco to pay a sum of money, and issued an order of execution against the supersedeas bond. Velasco then filed a petition for injunction in the CA to quash this execution. The CA ruled in favor of Velasco, holding that the supersedeas bond could not be executed because it was filed after the judgment of the Municipal Court had been executed (i.e., after possession was restored) and thus served no purpose. Ocampo-Cañiza filed the present petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the supersedeas bond filed by Velasco after the Municipal Court’s writ of execution had restored possession (but before the records were elevated to the CFI) could be executed to satisfy the monetary judgment (for unpaid rentals) rendered by the CFI on appeal.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the execution of the Municipal Court’s judgment was only partial, not complete. While possession was restored to Ocampo-Cañiza, the payment of back rentals ordered by the Municipal Court remained unsatisfied. The supersedeas bond, therefore, was not useless, as it allowed Velasco to prosecute his appeal without having to pay the back rentals pending appeal. Since the bond was approved by the Municipal Court and Velasco himself invoked it to seek restoration of possession (which the CFI granted), he could not later question its validity. Consequently, the bond could be executed to satisfy the monetary award (for rentals) in the CFI’s decision. The Court emphasized that a judgment in a forcible entry and detainer case has two parts: restoration of possession and payment of rents due. Only the first was executed by the Municipal Court; the second remained enforceable via the supersedeas bond.
