G.R. No. L-13223; May 30, 1960
OSCAR MENDOZA ESPUELAS, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF BOHOL, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Oscar Mendoza Espuelas was convicted of inciting to sedition on September 22, 1947, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty. On March 17, 1954, the President granted him a conditional pardon, remitting the unexpired portion of his sentence and the fine, “on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” Espuelas accepted this pardon on March 25, 1954, and was released. Subsequently, he was charged with usurpation of authority in the Justice of the Peace Court of Tagbilaran, Bohol, and was found guilty on August 29, 1956. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. On July 5, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal moved for a provisional dismissal of the case due to the absence of a key witness, which the court granted. On November 8, 1957, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President ordered Espuelas’s recommitment to serve the unexpired period of his original sentence. He was arrested on November 9, 1957. Espuelas filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, which was granted on November 22, 1957, ordering his release. The Provincial Warden appealed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the President may order the reincarceration of a grantee of a conditional pardon for violating its terms, based on the Executive’s determination of such violation, without a prior judicial conviction for the subsequent offense.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and upheld the President’s authority to order recommitment.
1. Under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President is empowered “to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.” This power was preserved by the Indeterminate Sentence Law ( Act No. 4103 , Section 9) and is a reiteration of earlier laws.
2. The condition of the pardon required that Espuelas “shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” Citing Tesoro vs. The Director of Prisons, the Court held that the condition is violated by the mere commission of another crime, not by a judicial conviction. The authority to determine a violation rests exclusively with the Chief Executive.
3. The Court rejected the argument that this executive power violates due process. A conditional pardon is an act of executive grace. By accepting it, the convict agrees to its conditions, including that the Executive may determine a breach. Due process in this context is not necessarily judicial, as the convict had already been afforded full judicial process for the original crime. His status is that of a convict at large by executive grace, not a citizen entitled to all constitutional safeguards against initial arrest.
4. The provisional dismissal of the usurpation case did not negate the Executive’s finding that a penal law had been violated, which was the condition for revoking the pardon.
Separate Opinion: Chief Justice Paras dissented, citing his dissenting opinions in the related cases of Sales vs. Director of Prisons and Infante vs. Director of Prisons.