NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS’ UNION, and BONIFACIO R. DE LUNA, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
The National Textile Workers’ Union filed a labor case (No. 129-V) with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) in 1948, which was decided on November 5, 1948. However, the case remained open due to various incidents. In August 1956, the Union filed a petition on behalf of 51 members (headed by Bonifacio R. de Luna), docketed as Case No. 129-V (7), claiming compensation for extra work hours. The claimants, who were daily wage workers assigned to administrative office duties (e.g., clerks, typists, accountants), alleged their implied employment contract followed the monthly-paid employees’ schedule: 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Monday-Friday) and 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (Saturday). They were required to work until 5:00 p.m. on weekdays and 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Saturdays (totaling 8 extra hours weekly). The company paid for these extra hours until 1950, when it stopped payment upon its auditor’s recommendation. The National Development Company moved to dismiss, arguing the CIR lost jurisdiction due to Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) and Republic Act No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law). The CIR denied the motion and, on October 12, 1957, issued an order directing its Examining Division to compute the overtime compensation due. The company’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the overtime compensation claim (Case No. 129-V (7)) filed in 1956.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the CIR had jurisdiction. The main case (No. 129-V) was filed and decided under Commonwealth Act No. 103. Under Section 17 of CA 103, the CIR retained powers to alter, modify, or reopen an award during its effectiveness. Although Republic Act No. 875 curtailed some CIR powers when enacted in 1953, its transitory provision (Section 27) mandated that all cases pending before the CIR at the time of the Act’s passage be processed according to CA 103. The main case was still open, unsettled, and pending in 1953 due to various incidental questions, and the 1956 petition was merely the seventh incident in that ongoing case. The CIR, in hearing the incident, acted within its jurisdiction under both CA 103 and RA 875. The petition was denied.
