G.R. No. L-13208; May 18, 1960
OREN IGO (BAGABO), ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE NATIONAL ABACA & OTHER FIBRES CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The plaintiffs, illiterate non-Christian Filipinos of the Bagobo tribe, claimed absolute ownership of two parcels of land in Davao City, inherited from the children of Yoon (Bagoba) and a Japanese national, Kiyosaki Saito. The Philippine Alien Property Administrator, treating the lands as property of Japanese nationals, issued Vesting Order No. P-688 and its Supplement on July 6, 1948, and April 4, 1949, respectively, vesting the lands in the U.S. Government under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Subsequently, the U.S. transferred its rights to the Republic of the Philippines under the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 477 , the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAPCO) administered and sold portions of the lands to other defendants. On August 27, 1953, plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Davao to recover the properties and damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction due to plaintiffs’ failure to file a claim with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator within the two-year period prescribed by Sections 9(a) and 33 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended.

RULING

Yes, the trial court’s order of dismissal is affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the action was not an ordinary reivindicatory suit but a direct attack on the vesting orders issued under the Trading with the Enemy Act and the subsequent transfer under the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Consequently, the mandatory requirements of the Trading with the Enemy Act apply. Sections 9(a) and 33 of said Act require that a suit for the return of vested property must be filed not later than April 30, 1949, or within two years from the date of vesting, whichever is later. Since the vesting orders were issued on July 6, 1948, and April 4, 1949, and the complaint was filed only on August 27, 1953—more than four years after vesting and with no pending claim or suit to toll the period—the action was barred. The defense of this statutory limitation is available not only to the U.S. Government or its representatives but also to the defendants who derived their title from the Philippine government, as the transferee. To hold otherwise would allow a claimant to circumvent the law and re-examine a title that had become absolute in the transferor due to the claimant’s failure to act timely.