G.R. No. L-1320; July 30, 1947
SANTIAGO DEGALA, petitioner, vs. PATRICIO C. CENIZA, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and VALENTIN UMIPIG, as special administrator of the estate of Placida Mina, respondents.

FACTS

The respondent Valentin Umipig was appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased Placida Mina in Civil Case No. 3689 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. The petitioner, Santiago Degala, filed an original action for certiorari, seeking relief from the respondent Judge’s failure or refusal to remove the special administrator. The petitioner’s motions for removal in the lower court were based on the following grounds: (1) Valentin Umipig has an interest adverse to the estate; (2) he is a stranger to the estate, not being a beneficiary under the alleged will; (3) he failed to include some estate properties in his inventory; (4) he failed to pay certain estate taxes; and (5) he failed to render an accounting despite court orders.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to remove the special administrator, Valentin Umipig, based on the grounds raised by the petitioner.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The removal of an administrator under Section 2, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court lies within the discretion of the appointing court. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the respondent Judge, as the alleged grounds were not sufficiently weighty to warrant the Court’s substitution of judgment. Specifically:
1. The fact that the special administrator’s attorney, Jesus Q. Quintillan, was a former administrator removed for adverse interest does not automatically disqualify the current administrator, as any adverse interest is personal to the attorney.
2. The respondent administrator, as a son of the deceased Crisanto Umipig, could represent his father as a trustee under the will, and the lower court’s order had not yet declared the trust provisions null and void.
3. The alleged failure to include properties in the inventory is a question of fact for the lower court to determine after receiving evidence, which it had already commissioned its clerk to do.
4. The failure to pay taxes could be due to a lack of funds rather than a willful omission.
5. The administrator did render an accounting on January 28, 1947. The timeliness and correctness of this accounting are matters for the respondent Judge’s discretion. The Court noted the respondent Judge could resort to the administrator’s bond if necessary and that a special co-administrator (the petitioner’s counsel) had also been appointed.
Separate Opinion:
Justice Perfecto concurred, stating that while the lower court’s extension of time for the administrator to file accounts was unreasonable and the administrator’s negligence justified removal, the lower court’s inaction was not arbitrary, abusive, or unwise. Therefore, the petition should be denied.