GR L 13109; (March, 1918) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-13109; March 6, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DALMACEO ANTIPOLO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Dalmaceo Antipolo was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Batangas for the murder of Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of homicide. During the trial, the defense sought to present Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the deceased, as a witness to testify regarding alleged dying declarations made by her husband before his death. The prosecution objected, arguing that as the widow of the deceased, she was disqualified from testifying under the rules of procedure, since her husband could not consent to her testimony. The trial judge sustained the objection and excluded her testimony. The defense excepted, asserting that the testimony would have been material and relevant, as it purported to show that the deceased’s injuries resulted from a fall, not from the acts imputed to the accused, which could have led to acquittal. Antipolo appealed the conviction, assigning the exclusion of the witness’s testimony as error.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the widow, Susana Ezpeleta, regarding the dying declarations of her deceased husband, on the ground of marital disqualification.
RULING:
Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court held that the marital disqualification rule under Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) does not apply to testimony concerning dying declarations. The purpose of the rule is to protect confidential communications between spouses and preserve marital harmony. However, dying declarations are not confidential; they are made with the expectation that they will be communicated to authorities after the declarant’s death to aid in the investigation of the cause of death. The Court cited American jurisprudence, including State v. Ryan and Arnett v. Commonwealth, which allow a widow to testify about her husband’s dying declarations, as the marital relation ceases upon death, and such declarations are not privileged communications. The exclusion of Ezpeleta’s testimony deprived the accused of a substantial right to present evidence that could have exonerated him. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was set aside, and a new trial was ordered, with instructions to admit the testimony of Susana Ezpeleta and any additional evidence from both parties. The costs of the appeal were declared de officio.
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