G.R. No. L-131; March 30, 1946
NARCISA DE LA FUENTE and her spouse JOSE TEODORO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LUIS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The case involves an appeal against a judgment from the Court of First Instance of Manila, which affirmed a municipal court decision ordering the defendant, Luis Borromeo, to vacate the ground floor of house No. 759, San Sebastian Street, Manila, and to pay a monthly rent of P40 from March 1, 1945, until he vacates the premises, plus costs. The plaintiffs, Narcisa de la Fuente and Jose Teodoro, sent letters on February 26 and March 23, 1945, demanding that the defendant vacate the property for two reasons: (1) they needed to occupy it because their house at No. 802 Indiana Street, Malate, Manila, was burned by Japanese forces on February 19, 1945; and (2) the defendant failed to pay rent for January to March 1945. The defendant neither vacated nor paid the claimed rent of P40 per month. The lease contract was on a month-to-month basis. The defendant also appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for postponement, which he filed on August 20, 1945, along with an unsworn medical certificate (Exhibit 1), after a previous hearing scheduled for August 16 had already been postponed to August 20 at his motion dated August 7.

ISSUE

1. Whether the defendant was lawfully ordered to vacate the leased premises and pay back rent.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for postponement of the hearing.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with modification regarding the accrual date of the rent.
1. On the Ejectment and Rent: The month-to-month lease ceased upon the expiration of its term without need of a special demand, pursuant to Article 1581 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs’ letters were sufficient to demand vacation and to exercise the corresponding action under Rule 72, Article 2. However, regarding rent payment, Manila was liberated from enemy occupation on March 10, 1945 (Proclamation No. 6). In accordance with the moratorium order (Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32), rent was only demandable from March 11, 1945, onwards. Therefore, the defendant should be liable for rent starting March 11, 1945, not March 1, 1945.
2. On the Denial of Postponement: The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The power to grant or deny motions for postponement and to resolve procedural matters rests on the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion results in the denial of the appellant’s essential rights. The medical certificate submitted by the defendant was not sworn to, failing to meet the requirements of Rule 31, Article 6, and the jurisprudence cited (Natividad vs. Marquez). The court had already granted one postponement. On the day of the rescheduled hearing (August 20), the defendant and his counsel failed to appear, and the court proceeded to hear the plaintiff’s evidence after denying the insufficient motion. No abuse of discretion was found.
The Court, aware of the housing crisis, stated it could not sanction any procedural principle aimed solely at unjustifiably delaying or frustrating the interests of justice.
DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the ground floor of house No. 759, San Sebastian Street, Manila, is affirmed. The defendant is ordered to pay rent of P40 per month from March 11, 1945, until he vacates the premises. No pronouncement as to costs.