G.R. No. L-13085, December 17, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EXEQUIEL S. VILLALON, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
On June 5, 1910, Exequiel S. Villalon was convicted of illegal marriage and sentenced to eight years and one day of prision mayor. On November 17, 1913, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison granted him a conditional pardon, remitting the unexecuted portion of his sentence. The condition was that Villalon “shall not again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year or more.”

On or about November 17, 1915, Villalon was charged with and later convicted of the crime of estafa. The Court of First Instance of Manila, applying the Penal Code and finding no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor. This conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 24, 1916.

Subsequently, the assistant fiscal of Manila filed an application with the Court of First Instance, alleging that Villalon’s estafa conviction violated the condition of his pardon. The trial court agreed, declared the pardon violated, and ordered Villalon recommitted to Bilibid Prison to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence for illegal marriage. Villalon appealed this order.

ISSUE:
Did the accused, Exequiel S. Villalon, violate the condition of his conditional pardon by being convicted of estafa and sentenced to six months of arresto mayor, when the penalty prescribed by law for that crime could extend to more than one year?

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, affirmed the trial court’s order of recommitment.

The Court held that the term “punishable” in the condition of the pardon refers to the possible penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed, not the actual penalty imposed by the court in a specific case. Since the crime of estafa, as defined under the relevant articles of the Penal Code, is punishable by a penalty ranging from arresto mayor to prision correccional in its minimum degree (which spans from over four months to two years and four months), it is an infraction “punishable by imprisonment for one year or more.”

The fact that the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and due to the absence of aggravating circumstances, imposed only the medium penalty of six months is immaterial. By committing an act that the law punishes with a potential penalty exceeding one year, Villalon violated the condition of his pardon. The Court interpreted the Governor-General’s intent as being to prohibit the pardonee from committing any felony (as broadly understood), as opposed to mere misdemeanors.

DISSENTING OPINION:
Justice Street, with whom Justice Carson concurred, dissented. The dissent argued that the term “infraction” in the pardon referred to the specific violation committed by the accused, not the general class of the crime. To determine if the condition was violated, one must look at the actual facts of the conviction. Since the court found no aggravating circumstances, the law required the imposition of the penalty in its medium degree, which was six months. Therefore, for this specific infraction, Villalon was not “punishable” by imprisonment for one year or more, as the court had no legal discretion to impose such a penalty based on the factual findings. The dissent also found the cited American authorities inapplicable due to differences in the penal systems regarding judicial discretion in sentencing.

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