G.R. No. L-13046; May 20, 1960
Emigdio T. Pascua, petitioner-appellant, vs. Hon. Pedro Tuason, etc., respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Emigdio T. Pascua was a District-Agent-at-large in the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On May 18, 1951, he was suspended from office by the Secretary of Justice due to an information filed against him for falsification of public documents (Criminal Case No. V-2971). While under this suspension, another criminal case for grave coercion (Criminal Case No. V-2999) was filed against him. Pascua was convicted in both cases by the Court of First Instance of Cebu but was subsequently acquitted in both by the Court of Appeals, with the acquittals becoming final on April 8, 1953, and October 8, 1954, respectively. Following his acquittals, Pascua requested reinstatement and payment of back salaries. The Secretary of Justice refused, citing new administrative charges filed against Pascua. These charges, filed on September 6, 1954, and October 15, 1955, included acts unbecoming a district agent (for managing a private information service during his suspension) and oppression, dishonesty, and negligence based on the facts underlying the criminal cases. These administrative charges were still pending. The Manila court of first instance, in a mandamus proceeding, ordered Pascua’s reinstatement with back salaries, unless he was or should be suspended by the Secretary of Justice based on the newly filed administrative charges. Both parties appealed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of mandamus should be issued to compel Pascua’s reinstatement and payment of back salaries, considering his acquittal in the criminal cases but the pendency of serious administrative charges against him.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus. The Court held that while the suspension based on the criminal charges had ended with Pascua’s acquittal, the Secretary of Justice had the prerogative to suspend or continue the suspension based on the pending serious administrative charges. The Court found that the Secretary’s refusal to reinstate Pascua, as explained in his answer, practically amounted to a determination to suspend him should such action be necessary. The Court noted that ordering reinstatement would be an empty formality, as the Secretary could immediately suspend him again based on the administrative charges, rendering the court’s order academic. Emphasizing the courts’ hesitation to intervene in executive department administrative practices and the principle that mandamus may only enforce a “clear and certain” legal right, the Court concluded that Pascua had no clear right to reinstatement under the circumstances. Therefore, the request for mandamus was denied.