G.R. No. L-12917; April 27, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant, vs. PASCUAL LABATETE, defendant and appellee.

FACTS

An information for estafa was filed against Pascual Labatete. It alleged that on January 27, 1953, he obtained a loan of P400 from Genoveva Malinao, giving as security only the improvements and products of his land under Original Certificate of Title No. 484. After failing to redeem the security within the stipulated period, he allegedly forfeited these improvements and products to Malinao. Later, on December 23, 1955, he obtained an extension and an additional loan, bringing the total debt to P2,300. While this debt was unpaid, he mortgaged the same improvements and products, along with the land title itself, to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) on February 28, 1956, to the damage and prejudice of Malinao.
On January 7, 1957, the accused pleaded not guilty, and trial commenced with the presentation of the offended party. The testimony was suspended when the accused filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the facts alleged did not constitute a crime because a mortgage on mere improvements and products (not the land itself) was invalid, especially since it was unrecorded, and thus the subsequent mortgage to the RFC created no conflict. On February 4, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur granted the motion, holding the facts did not constitute estafa and ordered the information dismissed. The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
The fiscal then filed a motion to admit an amended information. The amended information substantially altered the allegation, stating that the accused gave as security for the loan the land itself under OCT No. 484, not just its improvements and products, and that he subsequently mortgaged this same property to the RFC while the debt to Malinao remained unpaid. The court initially admitted the amended information but, upon the accused’s motion, reconsidered and denied its admission. The fiscal’s motion to reconsider this denial was also rejected, prompting the present appeal. The trial court’s denial was based on the ground that admitting the amended information would place the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly denied the admission of the amended information on the ground that it would violate the defendant’s right against double jeopardy.

RULING

Yes, the trial court’s order denying the admission of the amended information is affirmed.
The applicable rule is Section 13, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, which allows amendment of an information after plea and during trial only as to matters of form and when it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. A comparison of the original and amended informations reveals a substantial amendment. The original information alleged the mortgage of only the improvements and products of the land. The amended information alleged the mortgage of the land itself under OCT No. 484. This change alters the very acts imputed to the accused as constituting the offense. Such a substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused has pleaded and trial has begun, as held in People vs. Zulueta.
Furthermore, admitting the amended information would prejudice the accused’s right against double jeopardy. The trial on the original information had already commenced. The court’s order of February 4, 1957, which dismissed the original information after finding the alleged facts did not constitute the crime of estafa, was in legal effect a judgment of acquittal on the merits, not a mere dismissal. Whether this judgment was correct or incorrect, it constitutes a final termination of the case in favor of the accused and bars another prosecution for the same offense.
The Solicitor General’s argument that the accused waived his right against double jeopardy by moving for the dismissal of the original information is untenable. The Court clarified its abandonment of the principle in People vs. Salico cited by the appellant. A motion for dismissal based on the insufficiency of the evidence or the information’s failure to charge an offense, made after trial has begun, does not constitute an express consent to a dismissal that would allow a new prosecution. The judgment rendered in such a case is one of acquittal. Therefore, the amended information could not be admitted without placing the accused in double jeopardy for the same act.