G.R. No. L-1283; September 16, 1947
ANDRES RIOS, petitioner, vs. ANACLETO ROS, in substitution for the deceased Saturnino Ros, and HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of First Instance of Albay, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Andres Rios filed a petition for certiorari against respondent Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Albay. The petition alleged grave abuse of discretion in two orders: (1) the order dated November 4, 1946, denying Rios’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 38 based on excusable neglect; and (2) the order dated November 27, 1946, denying Rios’s motion to set aside a joint judgment dated November 18, 1944, rendered in two cases (G.R. Nos. 117 and 6222). Rios contended the judgment was a nullity as to case No. 117 because no evidence was presented in that case.
Regarding the first order, the lower court found that Rios’s attorney, Simplicio B. Peña, had actual knowledge of the November 18, 1944 judgment as early as May 5, 1945. On that date, a copy of the judgment was presented as Exhibit 3 in a separate case (Civil Case No. 1) filed by Rios against the same defendants for the same land, which was later dismissed on grounds of res judicata. The motion for relief was filed on October 26, 1946, more than seventeen months after Peña’s awareness, exceeding the six-month period allowed under Rule 38.
Regarding the second order, Rios argued the judgment was void because the two cases were not jointly tried and no evidence was presented in case No. 117. However, the text of the November 18, 1944 judgment itself stated that on June 28, 1944, the parties agreed to have the cases heard jointly and decided based on evidence adduced on January 31, 1939, a partial stipulation of facts from May 15, 1944, and other evidence. The hearing was set for October 12, 1944, but on that date, Rios and his counsel failed to appear despite due notice. The court then granted the motion of the opposing party, Saturnino Ros, to submit the cases for decision based on the evidence and stipulations already presented. A discrepancy in a notice date (October 13 vs. October 12, 1944) was attributed to a clerical error and was corrected.

ISSUE

1. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
2. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to set aside the November 18, 1944 judgment as null and void.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for certiorari.
1. On the first cause of action (denial of motion for relief): Certiorari does not lie. The order denying the motion for relief was a final order that terminated the ordinary proceeding in the case and was therefore appealable under Section 2, Rule 41. The petitioner failed to show that his inability to pursue an appeal was not due to his own fault or negligence. Furthermore, the order was in conformity with law. The lower court correctly found that petitioner’s attorney had known of the judgment since May 5, 1945, when it was presented in a related case. The motion for relief filed on October 26, 1946, was filed well beyond the six-month reglementary period from the date of knowledge, making the denial proper.
2. On the second cause of action (denial of motion to set aside judgment): Certiorari does not lie. The respondent judge had the jurisdiction to grant or deny the motion to set aside the judgment. If he erred in not declaring the judgment void, the proper remedy was appeal, not certiorari. The Court cannot correct alleged errors in this proceeding. Moreover, the respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner’s contention that the judgment was null and void for lack of evidence in case No. 117 was untenable. The judgment itself recited that the parties agreed to a joint hearing and decision based on stipulated evidence. The unverified allegations in the petition and an affidavit based on memory could not prevail over the recitals in the judgment. The discrepancy in the hearing date was a clerical error that was subsequently corrected. Therefore, the denial of the motion to set aside was proper.
Separate Opinions:
* Justice Hilado concurred in the denial solely on the ground that appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy.
* Justice Perfecto dissented, arguing that the November 18, 1944, judgment was rendered by a court organized under the Japanese imperial government and was therefore a nullity under the doctrine in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. He would have granted the petition to declare the judgment void and set it aside.