GR L 12747; (July, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-12747; July 30, 1960
RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. RIZAL CEMENT WORKER’S UNION (FFW), ET AL., respondents-appellees.
FACTS
On May 29, 1956, Rizal Cement Co., Inc. (petitioner) filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin Rizal Cement Workers’ Union (respondent) from illegal picketing during a strike declared on May 27, 1956. The lower court issued a preliminary injunction. The respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that under Republic Act No. 875 (the Magna Charta of Labor), the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) had exclusive jurisdiction over such labor dispute injunctions. The lower court initially denied the motion to dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction, citing the case of Reyes vs. Tan. Subsequently, on December 21, 1956, the President of the Philippines certified the strike to the CIR pursuant to Section 10(h) of Republic Act No. 875 . In light of this certification, the lower court reconsidered, dismissed the case, and dissolved the injunction. The petitioner appealed, insisting the Court of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the alleged acts of violence, threats, and coercion, and that jurisdiction, once acquired, could not be removed by a subsequent event.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila lost jurisdiction over the injunction case after the President certified the labor dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations under Republic Act No. 875 .
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order dismissing the case. The CIR acquires exclusive jurisdiction over a labor dispute when it is certified by the President as affecting an industry indispensable to the national interest, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 . The Court adhered to the objectives of the Magna Charta of Labor, which intends the CIR to be the repository of all actions involving labor disputes, especially those involving unfair labor practices, to avoid confusion, delay, and expedite settlement. The certification by the President lawfully withdrew the case from the Court of First Instance. The situation was one of abatement, where initial jurisdiction was validly divested by a subsequent statutory act. The order appealed from was affirmed.