G.R. No. L-1260; May 27, 1947
FEDERAL FILMS, INC., petitioner, vs. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IX, JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID and PABLO ROMAN, respondents.

FACTS

On September 27, 1946, petitioner Federal Films, Inc. received notice of the judgment rendered against it in Civil Case No. 73256. The following day, September 28, 1946, it filed a petition to set aside the judgment. On October 8, 1946, it was notified of the order denying that petition. On October 17, 1946, it filed a motion for reconsideration (which reiterated the grounds of the petition to set aside), and notice of the order denying this motion was served on October 31, 1946. On November 7, 1946, the petitioner filed its notice of appeal, record on appeal, and appeal bond. The respondent judge dismissed the appeal as having been perfected one day beyond the reglementary period. The petitioner then filed this original proceeding for certiorari to annul that dismissal order.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner perfected its appeal within the 30-day reglementary period prescribed by the Rules of Court, after deducting the time during which its petition to set aside the judgment was pending.

RULING

No, the appeal was not perfected on time. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The 30-day period to appeal is counted from notice of judgment (September 27, 1946). Under Rule 41, Section 3, the time during which a motion to set aside the judgment is pending shall be deducted from this period. The Court applied Rule 28 for computing periods, which excludes the first day (the day of the act or event) and includes the last day.
1. Total Period (Notice to Appeal): From September 27 (excluded) to November 7 (included) when the appeal was perfected, there are 41 days.
2. Pending Period (Motion to Set Aside): The motion was pending from September 28 (date of filing, excluded) to October 8 (date of notice of denial, included), which constitutes 10 days.
3. Net Period: Deducting the 10 pending days from the 41 total days results in 31 days. Therefore, the appeal was filed one day late.
The Court held that the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed on October 17 did not interrupt the running of the period, as it was a mere reiteration of the earlier petition to set aside. The Court also expressly overruled the computation method in Taroma vs. Cruz and Galinato which included both the filing date of the motion and the notice date of its denial in the deductible period. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the petitioner’s procedural complaint regarding the short notice for the hearing of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as the petitioner was able to file an opposition and argue at the hearing, and the respondent judge had good cause (his impending appointment to the Court of Appeals) to hear the matter promptly.
DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Perfecto):
The dissent argued that the appeal was timely. It contended that the motion to set aside was pending for 11 days (from September 28 to October 8, inclusive). Deducting 11 days from the 41-day total leaves 30 days, making the appeal timely. The dissent criticized the majority’s application of Rule 28, stating it was erroneous because the “time pending” of a motion is not a “period prescribed or allowed” by the rules but a factual duration. It argued that excluding the filing date (September 28) from the pending period contravenes the plain directive of Rule 41, Section 3 to deduct all the time the motion was actually pending.