G.R. No. L-12556; July 19, 1918
AUGUSTUS PHILIP BRANDT, ET AL., partners doing business under the firm name of “William Brandt’s Sons & Co.,” plaintiffs-appellants, vs. BEHN, MEYER & CO. (Ltd.), defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs, subjects of Great Britain, filed a complaint on January 21, 1916, against the defendant corporation, which was organized under the laws of the British Colony of the Straits Settlements. The case was initially set for trial on August 22, 1916. However, on July 15, 1916, the parties stipulated, with court approval, to continue the trial without a specific date, to be reset only upon request. The grounds were: (a) the need to take depositions in foreign countries, and (b) the parties’ hopes for an extrajudicial settlement. Subsequently, the court, on its own motion, set the case for hearing on December 20, 1916. The day before, plaintiffs filed a petition (agreed to by defendant’s attorneys) requesting another continuance, reiterating that settlement negotiations with the defendant’s liquidator in Singapore were ongoing and that they had refrained from taking necessary depositions abroad due to these negotiations. The trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution, citing that the case had been suspended for five months and the need to clear dormant cases from the docket. Plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute.

RULING:
Yes, the trial court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal.
While courts have inherent and statutory power (under Section 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure) to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute it for an unreasonable length of time, such dismissal is subject to review for abuse of discretion. The Court held that the delay in this case was not unreasonable under the specific circumstances. The primary reason for the delay was the ongoing negotiation for an extrajudicial settlement between the partiesa valid ground for a court to tolerate a delay. More importantly, the Court took judicial notice of the prevailing conditions of World War I, noting that the defendant corporation was in liquidation in Singapore and its members were subjects of a nation at war. The “unreasonable length of time” standard is relative, not absolute. The abnormal conditions of war, which could suspend statutes of limitation and make performance impracticable, justified a delay that might otherwise be considered unreasonable in peacetime. The Court concluded that it was an error to dismiss the action under these exceptional conditions. The case was ordered reinstated on the trial court’s calendar. No costs were awarded.