G.R. No. L-12399; May 29, 1959
RUFINO ADAN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NICASIA PANTALLA, respondent.

FACTS

The respondent, Nicasia Pantalla, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the petitioners (Rufino Adan, Celedonio Ribares, Elena Vda. de Clave, and Fabian Samson) to recover ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The petitioners, in their answer, claimed ownership over portions of the land, though the areas were undetermined. After several postponements, the trial was set for March 11, 1955. Notice was received by the petitioners’ counsel on February 17, 1955. On the trial date, both counsel informed the court they were ready for trial. The respondent presented her evidence. After she rested her case, the petitioners’ counsel moved for a continuance, alleging his clients had not appeared despite his written notice to them. The respondent objected, noting the counsel had stated readiness for trial and had received notice more than 20 days in advance. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, declaring her the owner, ordering the petitioners to pay P7,000, restore possession, and deliver 100 cavans of palay annually until restoration.
On April 14, 1955, the petitioners filed an unverified motion for new trial, alleging that some defendants received notice late or were absent due to being old, sickly, or in another province. This motion was not accompanied by affidavits of merit. The respondent opposed it. The petitioners’ counsel later filed a supplementary memorandum with affidavits of merit, stating it was agreed counsel would send notice to Rufino Adan, who would notify co-defendants; counsel sent a letter to Adan, but because Adan had gone to work in Camarines Norte, he received it only on March 13, 1955 (two days after the trial). The trial court found the motion not well-founded and denied it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the petitioners’ motion for postponement and motion for new trial based on mistake and excusable negligence.
2. Whether the damages awarded to the respondent were excessive.

RULING

1. The trial court did not err in denying the motions. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of both lower courts. Motions for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its exercise is generally upheld unless good reasons are shown to the contrary. The petitioners’ counsel had received notice more than three weeks before the trial, which was sufficient time to notify his clients. The failure of the petitioners to receive timely notice was deemed due to their own negligence, as a party has an obligation to inform his attorney of his whereabouts for ready contact. The reasons given for the failure to appear were not satisfactory. Furthermore, there had been two prior postponements granted at the petitioners’ instance, and a previous motion for continuance sent five days before trial did not conform to the Rules and gave no notice to the adverse party. The petitioners were not deprived of their day in court; they chose not to attend, wrongly assuming their motion would be granted. Continuances are granted for good cause, not merely at a party’s will.
2. The issue of excessive damages involves a question of fact not reviewable. The Supreme Court stated that the amount of damages awarded, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, involves a question of fact. This is not within the Supreme Court’s province to consider in this instance.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.