GR L 12375; (August, 1918) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-12375; August 30, 1918
DY CAY, administrator of the estate of DY KIU, deceased, appellant, vs. CROSSFIELD & O’BRIEN, appellees.
FACTS:
Dy Cay was appointed administrator of the estate of Dy Kiu. To prosecute an action for the liquidation of a partnership (Dy Buncio & Co.) in which the deceased had an interest, the administrator entered into a contract with the law firm Crossfield & O’Brien. The contract stipulated that the attorneys would receive ten percent (10%) of the sum collected from the partnership for their services. During the pendency of the liquidation proceedings, the attorneys entered into a stipulation agreeing to appoint a liquidator to determine the value of the deceased’s share. The liquidator reported the share to be P40,636.85. The administrator later objected to the stipulation, claimed he had not authorized it, and moved to discharge Crossfield & O’Brien as his attorneys. The trial court initially fixed the attorneys’ fees on a quantum meruit basis at P2,000. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the attorneys, a different judge later issued an order revoking the first decision and instead awarded the attorneys the full contractual fee of 10% of P40,636.85, or P4,063.68. The administrator appealed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether a judge of first instance retains jurisdiction to grant a new trial or modify a judgment after the 30-day period prescribed by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, has elapsed, provided the motion for such relief was filed on time.
2. Whether the attorneys, Crossfield & O’Brien, should be compensated based on the terms of their valid contract with the administrator or on a quantum meruit basis.
RULING:
1. On the Jurisdictional Issue: The Supreme Court held that while the law sets a 30-day period for a party to file a motion for a new trial, the court retains jurisdiction to decide such a timely filed motion even after the expiration of that 30-day period. The time during which the court considers the motion is not counted against the statutory period. To require a decision within 30 days regardless of the motion’s complexity would be subversive of justice. Therefore, the order modifying the first decision, though issued more than four months later, was valid since the motion for reconsideration was filed on time.
The order of the Court of First Instance dated August 17, 1916, was affirmed.