G.R. No. L-12240; April 15, 1959
BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Dr. Maximo Borromeo died in 1940, leaving a will that instituted the Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. as his heir and named Canuto O. Borromeo as executor. On July 12, 1949, the deceased’s widow, Johanna Hofer Borromeo, moved for Canuto’s removal as executor and for her own appointment as administratrix. The court removed Canuto but denied the widow’s appointment. After Canuto’s appeal was denied, the estate remained without an administrator. On January 26, 1956, the widow filed a motion reiterating her appointment as administratrix. The court, despite opposition from the heir-corporation, issued an order appointing her on January 27, 1956. She qualified, and letters of administration were issued. The oppositor filed a motion for reconsideration and, upon its denial, a notice of appeal on July 19, 1956. On July 21, 1956, the court issued another order directing the removed executor to deliver estate records to the widow and notifying the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China that the estate account was under her administration. The oppositor moved to set aside the letters of administration and the July 21 order, but these motions were denied. The oppositor then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, which was denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion regarding the July 21, 1956 order, and declined to rule on the propriety of issuing the letters of administration, stating the proper remedy was appeal. The petitioner now seeks review.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) issuing the order of January 27, 1956, directing that letters of administration be issued to the widow, allowing her to qualify as administratrix despite a pending appeal, and (2) issuing the order of July 21, 1956, directing the turnover of records and notifying the bank, all allegedly without complying with Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court regarding execution pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The Court ruled that while Section 2, Rule 39 generally requires a motion, notice, and a special order stating good reasons for execution pending appeal, its application is not absolute. The Court cited precedents (Alcasid vs. Samson and Borja vs. Tan) where immediate execution of orders appointing administrators was justified by special circumstances without strict compliance with the rule. In this case, special circumstances warranted the immediate effect of the orders: the estate proceedings had been dragging for almost ten years with little progress, and leaving the estate without a regular administrator (or only under a special administrator with limited powers of preservation) would keep the administration at a standstill. The Court also noted that while the trial court had previously found the widow unsuitable due to friction with collateral heirs, circumstances can change, and the court was justified in reconsidering its earlier stance, especially given its earlier expressed opinion that the widow had a better claim to management than the deceased’s brothers. The existence of good reasons for immediate execution, which can be found in the record even if not expressly stated in the order itself, validates the action. Therefore, no grave abuse of discretion was committed.