G.R. No. L-1205; May 24, 1947
OSCAR DE LEON, DOLORES DE LEON, HECTOR DE LEON, ROSARIO DE LEON-RAMIREZ, and EMILIO DE LEON, petitioners, vs. CEFERINO DE LOS SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and LEON S. DATOC, respondents.

FACTS

This is a petition to review an order of execution issued by the respondent judge. The underlying case involves the possession and ownership of a house and lot. The judgment of the court below declared the plaintiff (respondent Leon S. Datoc) the absolute owner of the properties and ordered the defendants (petitioners) to restore possession to him. The respondent judge issued the order of execution after the petitioners had submitted their record on appeal but before it was approved. The petitioners attack the order on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

1. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution pending appeal.
2. Whether the trial court loses jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal after the record on appeal is submitted but before it is approved.

RULING

1. No grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion. The respondent judge exercised his judgment with discrimination and deliberation, even ordering an ocular inspection of the house and a report on its condition before deciding the motion for execution. The inspection results and other factors reasonably warranted the order as a measure to preserve the building and protect the interests of the parties. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument to apply Section 9 of Rule 72 (governing stay of execution in forcible entry and detainer cases), holding that the applicable rule is Section 2 of Rule 39. The Court noted significant disparities between a possessory action and the instant case: in a detainer case, the plaintiff’s rights are protected by continued rent payments and the owner retains the right to make necessary repairs, whereas in this case, no compensation for use was provided in the decision and the plaintiff was not at liberty to make repairs. A supersedeas bond only secures the performance of the affirmed judgment and does not cover damage to the property during the appeal’s pendency.
2. The trial court retains jurisdiction. The Court held that the trial court does not lose jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal merely upon the submission of the record on appeal. Jurisdiction is lost only upon the approval of the record on appeal. The Court reasoned that accepting the petitioners’ view—that submission of the record on appeal divests the court of jurisdiction—would allow a losing party to nullify the court’s authority to order execution by immediately filing the notice of appeal, bond, and record on appeal before the winning party could move for execution. Section 2 of Rule 39 allows execution for good reason before the expiration of the time to appeal and does not expressly or impliedly prohibit it after the record on appeal is filed but before approval. The requirement that the execution order be included in the record on appeal applies only when the order is issued before the record is presented; it is not indispensable in all cases. This provision supports the theory that the court’s authority to order execution lasts for the time prescribed for appeal, provided the record on appeal has not been approved.
The petition was denied with costs against the petitioners.