G.R. No. L-11986; July 31, 1958
Bernardo Manalang, et al., petitioners-appellants, vs. Elvira Tuason de Rickards, et al., respondent-appellees.

FACTS

Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards owned a subdivision in Sampaloc, Manila. In 1954, due to an alleged increase in city land assessment, she notified her tenants, including Bernardo Manalang, Vicente de Leon, and Salvador de Leon, of corresponding rental increases. The tenants refused to pay the new rates and consigned the old rentals in court after the landowner refused to accept them. Rickards filed separate ejectment cases against the tenants in the Municipal Court of Manila. The tenants filed motions to dismiss invoking Republic Act No. 1162 (approved June 18, 1954). On July 14, 1954, the Municipal Judge issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and suspending the proceedings for two years from the Act’s enactment or until further court order. On April 13, 1955, upon Rickards’ motion, the Municipal Judge set the cases for hearing on the merits. The tenants’ motion for reconsideration was denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Rickards spouses and the Municipal Judges, arguing that the July 14, 1954, order had already disposed of the action and determined the parties’ rights. They sought to enjoin the judges from proceeding with the hearing. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition, ruling the Municipal Court’s order was merely interlocutory. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified it to the Supreme Court as involving purely legal questions.

ISSUE

Whether the order of the Municipal Court dated July 14, 1954, is interlocutory or final, and consequently, whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance, holding that the Municipal Court’s July 14, 1954, order was interlocutory, not final. The Court explained that while the body of the order contained statements regarding the effects of Republic Act No. 1162, its dispositive portion clearly denied the motion to dismiss and merely suspended the proceedings. The issues in the ejectment cases were not settled; the motion to dismiss was denied, and the proceedings were only suspended. The court retained jurisdiction and had the power to reopen the cases for trial on the merits. The controlling factor is the resolution embodied in the dispositive part of the order. Since the dispositive part did not touch on the merits or finally dispose of the issues, the order was interlocutory and could not be the subject of a certiorari action. The petition was correctly dismissed.