G.R. No. L-11766; October 25, 1960
SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for legal separation and change of surname against her husband, defendant Zoilo Praxedes, in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur on April 24, 1956, alleging abandonment and concubinage. The defendant denied the allegations, claiming it was the plaintiff who left the conjugal home. During the trial, where only the plaintiff presented evidence, the following facts were established: The parties were legally married on January 10, 1943. On May 30, 1944, they agreed to live separately due to marital disagreements, and this separation continued. On April 3, 1948, they entered into a written agreement (Exhibit B), which included stipulations that: (a) both relinquished their rights as legal spouses; (b) both were free to take another mate and live as husband and wife without interference, and neither could prosecute the other for adultery, concubinage, or any crime arising from the separation; (c) the wife was no longer entitled to support from the husband, nor the husband from the wife; and (d) neither could claim anything from the other from May 30, 1944, onward. In January 1955, the defendant began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado, who gave birth to a child recorded as the defendant’s on September 1, 1955, and they were generally reputed as husband and wife in the community. The trial court found that the defendant’s acts constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation, but dismissed the complaint on two grounds: (1) the action was filed beyond the one-year period from the plaintiff’s knowledge of the cause (January 1955 to April 24, 1956), as required by Article 102 of the New Civil Code; and (2) under Article 100 of the New Civil Code, legal separation may only be claimed by the innocent spouse if there has been no condonation or consent to the adultery or concubinage, and the agreement (Exhibit B) showed the plaintiff’s consent to the defendant’s concubinage. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court erred in finding the action time-barred and that she had consented to the concubinage.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for legal separation on the grounds that (1) the action was filed beyond the prescriptive period under Article 102 of the New Civil Code, and (2) the plaintiff had consented to the concubinage under the terms of their agreement (Exhibit B), barring her claim under Article 100 of the New Civil Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the dismissal was proper. On the first issue, the Court noted that Article 102 of the New Civil Code requires an action for legal separation to be filed within one year from the date the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause. The plaintiff admitted she became aware of the concubinage in January 1955 but filed the complaint only on April 24, 1956, which was beyond the one-year period. The plaintiff did not contest this point in her brief. On the second issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that the agreement (Exhibit B), particularly paragraph (b), expressly allowed both parties to take another mate and live as husband and wife without interference, and prohibited prosecution for concubinage. This stipulation constituted clear consent by the plaintiff to the defendant’s concubinage. Under Article 100 of the New Civil Code, legal separation may only be claimed by the innocent spouse if there has been no condonation or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Since the plaintiff consented in writing, she was not entitled to legal separation. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s alternative argument that the dismissal should be based on a pre-existing legal separation, as it was contrary to the evidence. The decision was affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff.