G.R. No. L-11566; August 10, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELO JOSE and TAN BO, defendants. MARCELO JOSE, appellant.

FACTS:
Marcelo Jose and Tan Bo were partners in the mercantile firm Marcelo Jose & Co. located in Olongapo. They were arrested on May 16, 1915. The following afternoon, authorities searched their store and found a one-tenth part of a Macao lottery ticket. At the time of the search, neither partner was present. Both were charged with and convicted of violating Section 3 of Act No. 1523 (the lottery law) for having possession of a lottery ticket. The trial court sentenced each to pay a fine. Only Marcelo Jose appealed.

At trial, Tan Bo, the managing partner, testified that the ticket was sent to him by a friend from Amoy, that he alone placed it in a drawer in the store, and that his partner Marcelo Jose had never seen it. Marcelo Jose testified that he lived in Manila, only visited Olongapo when necessary for business, and was unaware of the ticket’s existence until it was presented in court.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant Marcelo Jose had illegal possession (animus possidendi) of the lottery ticket found on the partnership’s premises.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court REVERSED the judgment of conviction and ACQUITTED appellant Marcelo Jose.

The Court applied the doctrine established in opium cases, specifically United States vs. Tin Masa, to violations of the lottery law. It held that mere presence of a prohibited article on premises occupied by the accused is not sufficient for conviction. The prosecution must prove the animus possidendithat the accused knowingly had possession and control of the article.

In this case, the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of both partners provided a full and satisfactory explanation. It established that the ticket was the personal property of Tan Bo, placed in the store without the knowledge of Marcelo Jose, who was a non-resident partner. This explanation was consistent with innocence and created a reasonable doubt as to Marcelo Jose’s guilty knowledge and intent to possess. Therefore, the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.

The Court did not find it necessary to resolve the appellant’s other assigned error regarding the appointment of counsel.

SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Moreland concurred in the result (acquittal) but vigorously dissented from the majority’s statement of the law. He argued that the established doctrine was that finding a prohibited article on an accused’s premises is prima facie evidence of possession sufficient to sustain a conviction. The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption of knowledge. He contended that the majority’s requirement for the prosecution to affirmatively prove knowledge (animus possidendi) beyond the fact of discovery on the premises added a new element and contradicted prior jurisprudence.