G.R. No. L-11374; May 30, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIOSCORO PINUILA, ET AL., defendants, ABSALON BIGNAY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Early in the morning of October 20, 1948, Buenaventura Dideroy was fatally attacked with wooden clubs while sleeping inside the cabin of Barge No. 560, anchored near the mouth of the Victorias River, Negros Occidental. The police investigation led to the arrest of Dioscoro Pinuila, Conrado Daiz, and appellant Absalon Bignay, who were charged with murder. The trial court initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, believing the barge was not within its territorial jurisdiction. The prosecution appealed this dismissal. The Supreme Court, in a 1952 decision, ruled that the trial court did have jurisdiction and that the appeal did not constitute double jeopardy, remanding the case for further proceedings. Upon resumption, only Bignay could be apprehended; his co-accused remained at large. The evidence established that Pinuila held a grudge against Dideroy from a prior fight in Manila. Pinuila enlisted Bignay and Daiz, paying them two pesos each, ostensibly to retrieve his equipment from the barge. The three boarded the barge and attacked Dideroy. An eyewitness, Bonifacio del Cano, identified them. During the police investigation, Sergeant Manuel Ligada tricked the accused into appearing by falsely stating Dideroy was alive and sought a settlement. Pinuila admitted the motive, and Bignay impliedly admitted participation. The trial court found Bignay guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation, with aggravating circumstances, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

The primary issue resolved by the Supreme Court in its ruling was the proper penalty for appellant Absalon Bignay, considering his degree of culpability and the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. A secondary issue, raised in a dissenting opinion, was whether the prosecution’s appeal from the initial dismissal and the subsequent trial placed Bignay in double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision. It found appellant Bignay the least guilty of the three accused. The Court disbelieved that evident premeditation, which qualified the crime as murder, applied to Bignay, as it was unlikely he agreed to kill Dideroy for only two pesos; he likely only realized the sinister purpose upon boarding the barge. Thus, the qualifying circumstance was treachery (alevosia). With no other aggravating circumstances and with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender present, the penalty for murder was imposed in its minimum degree: reclusion temporal in its maximum degree. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentenced Bignay to an indeterminate penalty of not less than twelve years of prision mayor and not more than seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal. The Court noted Bignay had already been in jail for about seven years. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Paras, concurred in by Justice Felix, argued that the prosecution’s appeal from the initial dismissal and the subsequent trial constituted double jeopardy, as the dismissal was based on the trial court’s conclusion on the merits (lack of jurisdiction due to territory being an element of the offense) after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. They contended the 1952 Supreme Court decision was erroneous and should not be applied retroactively against the appellant.