GR L 11324; (March, 1958) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-11324; March 29, 1958
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YU BAO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The defendant-appellant, Yu Bao, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with violating Republic Act No. 1180 (The Retail Trade Nationalization Act). The information, filed on October 2, 1954, alleged that Yu Bao, a non-citizen who was not actually engaged in the retail business prior to May 15, 1954, obtained Permit No. 4345 to operate a retail business on or about May 22, 1954. After being required by the Quezon City Treasurer to surrender said permit and desist from engaging in the retail business, he willfully refused and continued to engage in the business. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence including Yu Bao’s license application (Exhibit “A”) where he stated he was the holder of Alien Certificate of Registration No. 32560, and testimony from city officials who notified him on August 8, 1954, to close his store and surrender his license, and later found it still open on October 12, 1954. After the prosecution rested, the defense moved for dismissal on grounds of the law’s unconstitutionality and insufficiency of evidence, but the court denied the motion, found Yu Bao guilty, and sentenced him to three years of prision correccional, a P3,000 fine, and deportation after service. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court due to the constitutional question raised.
ISSUE
1. Whether Republic Act No. 1180 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the crime, specifically Yu Bao’s alienage and his engagement in the retail business after being ordered to stop.
3. Whether the penal provisions of Republic Act No. 1180 constitute an ex post facto law when applied to Yu Bao’s case.
RULING
1. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180, citing its earlier decision in Ichong vs. Hernandez. The Court ruled that the law was a valid exercise of police power to address the threat of alien dominance in the retail trade, did not violate equal protection or due process, was prospective in operation, and its provisions were within the title of the Act.
2. The Court found the evidence sufficient. Yu Bao’s alienage was established through his own admission in his license application (Exhibit “A”) where he declared himself an alien holder of an Alien Certificate of Registration, and by his judicial admission in a motion for continuance. His violation was proven by testimony that he was ordered to cease business on August 8, 1954, but was found still operating on October 12, 1954, which covered the period leading to the filing of the information on October 2, 1954.
3. The Court ruled that the penal provisions are not an ex post facto law. An ex post facto law punishes an act innocent when done. Here, the law did not penalize Yu Bao for engaging in retail before its approval on June 19, 1954; it penalized his continuation of the business after the law took effect. His license, obtained on May 22, 1954, was revoked by the law, which only allowed aliens engaged in the business on or before May 15, 1954, to continue. His defiance of the closure order constituted the violation.
The decision of the lower court was affirmed.
