G.R. No. L-11138, December 15, 1915
WALTER E. OLSEN & CO., petitioner, vs. BERNARD HERSTEIN, as the Insular Collector of Customs of the Philippine Islands, and JAMES J. RAFFERTY, as the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Walter E. Olsen & Co., a manufacturer and exporter of cigars made from Philippine-grown tobacco, applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a “certificate covering the origin” for a shipment of 10,000 “cortado” cigars (straight wrappers, truncated cone shape) intended for export to the United States. The application complied with the required documentation to demonstrate the cigars’ eligibility for duty-free entry into the U.S. under the Tariff Act of 1913. The Collector of Internal Revenue refused to issue the certificate, not on the ground that the tobacco was not of Philippine origin, but because the “cortado” cigars did not conform to a departmental regulation issued on January 26, 1915, which provided that certificates would only be issued for “standard” cigars (regular shape, spiral wrapper, uniform diameter). The Collector deemed the “cortado” cigars not “well made” and thus not entitled to the “standard mark” a certificate would confer. Subsequently, the petitioner’s application to the Insular Collector of Customs for a “certificate of origin” was also refused because the required certificate from the Collector of Internal Revenue was not presented. The petitioner filed an action for mandamus, alleging that the regulation was arbitrary, discriminatory, illegal, and an unauthorized attempt to legislate, and that the respondents had a duty to issue the certificates.

ISSUE:
Whether a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the Insular Collector of Customs and the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue certificates of origin for the petitioner’s cigars.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition. The Court held that mandamus under Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies only (a) to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty, or (b) to grant the use and enjoyment of a clear legal right. The petitioner failed to establish either ground.

First, the Court found no statute that specially enjoins upon the respondents the duty to issue the certificates in question. The relevant provision of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1913 merely grants free entry to Philippine products meeting certain conditions but does not impose a ministerial duty on Philippine officials to issue certificates. The requirement for such certificates originated from Executive Order No. 41 (issued by the Governor-General), which established an administrative procedure for local certification to facilitate proof of origin for U.S. customs. This executive order, however, is an internal administrative directive governing relations between executive officials. It creates no legal rights enforceable by third parties in court. The duty to obey such an order exists only between the issuing superior and the subordinate official; its enforcement and any punishment for disobedience rest solely with the executive department, not the judiciary.

Second, the petitioner possessed no clear legal right to the certificates. The executive order conferred a valuable administrative convenience or opportunity, but not a legal right that can be enforced by mandamus. The petitioner’s proper remedy, if any, lies with the executive authority that promulgated the order.

The Court emphasized the separation of powers, stating that courts must confine themselves to enforcing legal and equitable rights and cannot intervene to compel compliance with internal departmental orders, rules, or regulations, as this would lead to confusion and conflict between the branches of government.