G.R. No. L-10992; January 6, 1916
QUE QUAY, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
Que Quay arrived at the port of Manila from China on May 3, 1915, claiming the right to enter the Philippine Islands as a citizen. He asserted he was the illegitimate son of a Filipino woman, Hilaria Santa. An immigration inspector refused him admission, and his case was heard by a Board of Special Inquiry. The Board, after considering testimonial evidence and observing Que Quay’s personal appearance, language, dress, manner, and deportment, found he was a full-blooded Chinese laborer and not the son of Hilaria Santa. It denied him landing under the Chinese Exclusion Laws. The Insular Collector of Customs affirmed this decision. Que Quay then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, which was denied. He appealed, assigning several errors.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the return to the writ of habeas corpus filed by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs was valid and sufficient.
2. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in refusing to hear new witnesses presented by Que Quay during the habeas corpus proceeding.
3. Whether the Board of Special Inquiry was legally constituted.
4. Whether there was legal evidence to support the Board’s finding that Que Quay was a Chinese laborer not entitled to enter.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, denying the writ of habeas corpus.

1. On the Sufficiency of the Return: The return filed by the Attorney-General was valid. The law permits the Attorney-General to make the return on behalf of the Collector of Customs. The return adequately stated that Que Quay was a Chinese laborer with no right to enter, was detained after a proper hearing, and was held for deportation. It set forth the authority and cause for his restraint as required by law.

2. On Refusal to Hear New Witnesses: The Court of First Instance did not err. A court cannot interfere with the Collector’s custody in exclusion cases unless it is shown that the Board of Special Inquiry acted on a wrong principle of law or abused its authority. Since the lower court found no such abuse or error, it had no jurisdiction to try the case anew or receive additional evidence. Its role was limited to reviewing the legality of the administrative proceedings.

3. On the Legality of the Board: The Court found this issue had been settled repeatedly in prior cases, holding such Boards to be legally qualified. No further discussion was deemed necessary.

4. On the Existence of Legal Evidence: There was substantial legal evidence to support the Board’s decision. The Board was not required to believe the testimonial evidence presented by Que Quay and his witnesses. It properly considered, alongside the testimony, Que Quay’s personal characteristicshis appearance, language, dress, and mannerall of which indicated he was a full-blooded Chinaman who had lived in China for 29 years. The weight given to such personal observation by the trier of fact is recognized in law and is not subject to review by the appellate court in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. The Collector of Customs could decide the appeal based on the record without personally seeing Que Quay, just as appellate courts decide cases based on trial court records that include observations of witness demeanor.

Separate Opinion:
Justice Carson concurred in the result but expressed the view that, as a matter of good practice, the Attorney-General should attach a certified copy of the administrative proceedings to the return in habeas corpus cases. This would best inform the court of the detention’s grounds and aid the petitioner in securing a fair adjudication of his liberty.