G.R. No. L-1094; October 8, 1947
FIDEL SAHAGUN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. EMILIO PEÑA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, THE SHERIFF OF CITY OF MANILA, and F. L. PIMENTEL, respondents.

FACTS

1. Petitioners (Fidel Sahagun, Alejandro Ragajo, Valeriano Lontoc, Severino Tortona, Emiliano Custodio, and Ngo Gioc alias Tan Dian) entered into separate written contracts of lease with the predecessor-in-interest of respondent F. L. Pimentel for lots on Azcarraga Street, Manila.
2. Each contract stipulated a fixed monthly rental (ranging from P80 to P430) and a termination date of July 31, 1946.
3. Each contract contained a clause stating that if, upon expiration, the lessor needed the premises and the lessee refused to surrender them, the lessee would pay a significantly higher monthly rental (ranging from P200 to P900) from the expiration date until surrender.
4. Upon the petitioners’ failure to vacate by July 31, 1946, despite a notice to vacate, respondent Pimentel filed complaints for illegal detainer in the Municipal Court of Manila, demanding possession and payment of the higher stipulated rentals.
5. The Municipal Court rendered judgments in favor of Pimentel, ordering the petitioners to vacate and pay the higher rentals until they did so.
6. The petitioners appealed these judgments to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
7. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioners did not file a supersedeas bond nor deposit with the court the monthly rental amounts as determined by the Municipal Court’s judgments. Instead, they deposited only the original, lower pre-July 1946 rental amounts, claiming the adjudicated higher rents were onerous and violated Administrative Order No. 12 (which allegedly prohibited rent increases beyond 25% of pre-war rates).
8. Respondent Pimentel moved for execution of the Municipal Court’s judgments due to the petitioners’ failure to comply with the deposit requirement. Respondent Judge Emilio Peña granted the motion and issued orders of execution.
9. The petitioners filed this special action for certiorari and prohibition, arguing the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Did the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the orders of execution of the Municipal Court’s judgments during the pendency of the petitioners’ appeal?

RULING

No. The petition is denied.
1. On the First Ground (Lack of Jurisdiction of Municipal Court): The Supreme Court held that certiorari is not the proper remedy to challenge the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction after a judgment has been rendered and an appeal has been taken. The appeal itself is the correct remedy. Any error by the Municipal Court, including its finding on the sufficiency of the demand to vacate (which was allegedly amended in the complaint), is a matter for the appellate Court of First Instance to decide, not for review via certiorari.
2. On the Second Ground (Failure to Deposit Correct Rent): The Court ruled that the respondent judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, a defendant-appellant wishing to stay execution must file a supersedeas bond and pay to the plaintiff or deposit with the court “the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract… as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court.” The petitioners were obligated to deposit the specific monthly amounts adjudicated by the Municipal Court (the higher post-July 1946 rents), not the different amounts they claimed were due (the original lower rents). Whether the Municipal Court erred in its factual finding regarding the contractual rent or in not applying Administrative Order No. 12 is a question of law or fact to be resolved in the pending appeal before the Court of First Instance, not in a certiorari proceeding. The execution orders were a proper consequence of the petitioners’ failure to comply with the mandatory deposit requirement.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
* Justice Hilado (Concurring): Concurred, emphasizing that if the petitioners believed the increased rents were unreasonable after their leases expired, their remedy was to vacate. By choosing to remain, they were bound by the terms they had expressly agreed to in their contracts, absent any showing of illegality.
* Justice Paras (Dissenting, joined by Justice Perfecto): Argued that the amounts stipulated for after July 31, 1946, were not true “rent” but liquidated damages for illegal detainer. Therefore, petitioners should only have been required to deposit the original, lower rents during the appeal. He also contended that the drastic rent increases were unreasonable and immoral, especially as the premises were vacant lots, and that the execution procedure frustrated the tenants’ right to a meaningful appeal.