G.R. No. L-10856; August 28, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO KILAYKO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The defendant-appellant, Eugenio Kilayko, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of the crime of estafa and sentenced to presidio correccional, to indemnify the injured party, Luzuriaga, in the sum of P2,500 with interest (or to return a promissory note for the same amount endorsed by Mirasol), and to pay costs.

The facts established are: In October 1914, Kilayko obtained from Luzuriaga a promissory note for P2,500 (due October 2, 1914) under the obligation to return it or to provide a renewed note. Kilayko destroyed the original note. In January 1915, Luzuriaga paid a debt for which he was surety. Kilayko presented a new note dated January 21, 1915, claiming it was a renewal of the October note. Luzuriaga testified the original note was never returned, renewed, or paid, and that the new note represented a partial payment on his own debt. A law clerk corroborated that Kilayko admitted destroying the first note.

During arraignment, Kilayko informed the court he was unprepared. The court reminded him the case had been continued for a week and he must get a lawyer. Kilayko stated if no further continuance was granted, he would defend himself, as he had no money for a lawyer. The trial proceeded.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly inform the defendant of his right to counsel and in proceeding with the trial without assigning him counsel.
2. Whether the trial court erred in its assessment of the evidence and in finding the defendant guilty of estafa.
3. Whether the trial court correctly imposed an indemnity for P2,500.

RULING:
1. On the Right to Counsel: The Supreme Court held there was no error. The rights under section 17 of General Order No. 58 are personal and may be waived. By announcing he would defend himself, Kilayko expressly waived his right to the aid of counsel. He had the right to conduct his own defense, and under the circumstances, a continuance to secure counsel was unnecessary.

2. On the Crime of Estafa: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The crime of estafa under Article 535(9) of the Penal Code (by destroying a document) requires two elements: (a) fraud, and (b) injury. Both were present:
Fraud: Kilayko’s destruction of the original note and his attempt to pass off a new note as its renewal demonstrated an intent to defraud Luzuriaga by depriving him of evidence of the debt.
Injury: The destruction of the note, a valuable document, caused positive injury to Luzuriaga by making it more difficult for him to enforce collection of the debt. The extent of the fraud is based on the face value of the note (P2,500), regardless of whether the amount is ultimately collected.

3. On the Civil Indemnity: The Supreme Court modified the judgment by eliminating the order for Kilayko to indemnify Luzuriaga in the sum of P2,500. Following precedent (U.S. vs. Tan Jenjua, U.S. vs. Raboy, U.S. vs. Diris), the destruction of the promissory note does not necessarily result in the loss of its face value (e.g., the debt may still be proven or collected). Therefore, while the penalty is graded according to the value of the document, a civil indemnity for the full amount is not proper in the criminal case for this form of estafa.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The appealed judgment is MODIFIED by eliminating the indemnity. In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant.