G.R. No. L-10832; June 29, 1959
ANTONIO M. BUENAVENTURA, VIRGINIA JURADO DE LEON, GODOFREDO JURADO and CORAZON JURADO LAMAGNA, petitioners, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY and HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS

On May 26, 1955, Antonio M. Buenaventura filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Antonio L. Geronimo. The Philippine Trust Company was appointed special administrator. The special administrator reported that the petitioners were occupying estate properties (premises on Dapitan and Kanlaon streets, Quezon City) and prayed they be ordered to vacate if they could not pay rentals. An oppositor to the probate moved that the special administrator be directed to file a detainer action against the petitioners and to sell personal properties of the estate. The probate court initially denied these motions, leaving the filing of a detainer action to the special administrator’s discretion. Later, the special administrator petitioned for authority to sell furniture and fixtures (Items 9-35 of the inventory) in the possession of petitioner Corazon Jurado Lamagna, arguing they were being used and would depreciate. Buenaventura objected, stating the properties were not perishable, were antiques with sentimental value, the estate was solvent, and they were left in Lamagna’s possession by the special administrator. The special administrator also moved for the court to direct the petitioners to deliver possession of the occupied premises. On April 21, 1956, the probate court issued an order: (1) granting the petitioners 15 days to pay arrears in rentals and vacate the premises, under penalty of contempt; and (2) authorizing the special administrator to take possession of and sell the furniture and fixtures at the best price obtainable. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether the probate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioners to vacate the estate premises and pay rentals under penalty of contempt.
2. Whether the probate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing the special administrator to sell the furniture and fixtures of the estate.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and annulled the probate court’s order of April 21, 1956.
1. On the order to vacate and pay rentals: The Court ruled that the probate court had no jurisdiction to issue such an order. The proper action to recover possession of the premises is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer (if within one year from deprivation or withholding of possession), which is exclusively cognizable by inferior courts, or an accion publiciana (if after one year), which is exclusively cognizable by Courts of First Instance in their general jurisdiction. The petitioners had been occupying the premises before the owner’s death. Regardless of whether their occupancy was gratuitous or by lease, the action to dispossess them must be brought in the proper court, not the probate court. The probate court’s power to collect estate properties does not override this specific jurisdictional rule.
2. On the authority to sell the furniture and fixtures: The Court ruled the authorization was unauthorized. Under Section 3, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, a special administrator may only sell “perishable and other property as the court orders sold.” The chattels in question (furniture and fixtures) were not perishable. The sole reason given by the special administrator for the sale—that it was “for the best interest of the estate” because the items were being used and would depreciate—was insufficient to justify the order of sale under the rule.
The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued was made final. No costs were awarded.