GR L 10824; (February, 1958) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-10824; February 28, 1958
JOSE BENARES MONTELIBANO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. CARLOS BENARES, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, praying for a declaration of co-ownership over 3,000 shares of stock of the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., issued in the defendant’s name, an accounting, distribution of shares and dividends, and damages. The defendant denied co-ownership. After several postponements, mostly at the plaintiffs’ instance, the court set the hearing for February 18 and 19, 1954. On February 9, 1954, the plaintiffs filed a motion for postponement, citing the withdrawal of their chief counsel and the unavailability of another attorney who was engaged as a private prosecutor in a separate murder case. The court heard the motion on February 13 but deferred action as the defendant had not yet received notice and could object. On the scheduled hearing date, February 18, neither the plaintiffs nor their attorneys appeared. The defendant’s counsel appeared, objected to any postponement, and complained of repeated delays. The court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs filed an amended petition for relief under Rule 38, citing mistake or excusable neglect. The trial court denied the petition. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court as it involved an amount exceeding P50,000 and raised only questions of law.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in (1) dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to appear at the hearing, and (2) denying their subsequent petition for relief from the order of dismissal.
RULING
No, the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
1. On the Dismissal of the Complaint: The dismissal was pursuant to Section 3, Rule 30 (now Section 3, Rule 17), which allows dismissal when the plaintiff fails to appear at trial or to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time. The Supreme Court held that such dismissal rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent abuse. The record showed the hearing had been postponed no less than five times at the plaintiffs’ instance, with the court issuing prior warnings. The plaintiffs’ motion for another postponement, filed nine days before the hearing, did not entitle them to presume it would be granted. The reasons given—withdrawal of counsel and another attorney’s prior engagement—were insufficient, especially since the plaintiffs had other attorneys of record and had been notified of the withdrawal over a month prior. The trial court’s denial of the continuance and dismissal for non-appearance was a proper exercise of discretion.
2. On the Denial of the Petition for Relief: Petitions for relief under Rule 38 are likewise addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The plaintiffs’ grounds—”mistake” in thinking their postponement would be granted, and “excusable neglect” due to their attorney’s other trial—were correctly deemed insufficient by the trial court. A court does not abuse its discretion by deferring resolution of a postponement motion and later denying it. The Supreme Court acknowledged the substantial value of the property involved and that the plaintiffs stood to lose on a procedural point, but reiterated that the absence of abuse of discretion in the trial court’s actions precluded reversal.
The orders appealed from were affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
