G.R. No. L-10619; February 28, 1958
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE ROCO Y. DOMINGUEZ ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The plaintiffs filed an amended and supplemental complaint alleging they had been in continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passageway traversing the defendants’ land for over 20 years to access Igualdad Street and the Naga City market from their residential land. They claimed the defendants and their predecessors had long recognized this easement. The complaint further alleged that on May 12, 1953, the defendants started constructing a chapel in the middle of this right of way, obstructing it, and later, on July 10, 1954, other defendants, with approval, forcibly closed the passageway with posts and barbed wire, preventing the plaintiffs’ access. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as the appeal involved only a question of law.

ISSUE

The sole issue is whether an easement of right of way can be acquired through prescription.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, holding that under the provisions of the Civil Code (both old and new), an easement of right of way cannot be acquired through prescription. The Court classified an easement of right of way as a discontinuous (or intermittent) easement, as its use depends on acts of man and occurs at intervals. Under Articles 537 and 539 of the Old Civil Code (and Articles 620 and 622 of the New Civil Code), discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, can be acquired only by virtue of a title and not by prescription. The Court cited commentators Manresa and Sanchez Roman and its prior decision in Bargayo vs. Camumot to support this view. It distinguished the case of Municipality of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, noting that the term “prescription” used therein likely referred to “immemorial usage” under pre-Civil Code law, not adverse possession under the Code of Civil Procedure. While a minority opinion and commentators like Professor Tolentino suggested that the Code of Civil Procedure might have allowed prescription for discontinuous easements, the majority held that the prevailing law, as stated in the Civil Code, does not permit the acquisition of a right of way by prescription.