G.R. No. L-10339; November 29, 1957
G.P.T.C. EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and GONZALO PUYAT TIMBER CONCESSION, respondents.

FACTS

The G.P.T.C. Employees’ Union, a labor organization of workers in the Gonzalo Puyat Timber Concession, presented an 8-point demand to the company on September 19, 1951. The demands included payment for alleged overtime services rendered from April 1, 1950, sick and vacation leaves with pay, free emergency dental treatment, reinstatement of a specific employee (Graciano Martinez), and recognition of the union as the sole bargaining agency. After the parties failed to reach an agreement, the Secretary of Labor certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), docketed as Case No. 630-V. A work stoppage occurred on December 3, 1951, which the union considered a lockout and the company an unlawful strike. The CIR ruled it was a lawful strike and ordered the workers’ readmission under previous terms. Subsequently, the company filed a petition to reorganize its personnel. Hearings were conducted where both parties presented evidence. The CIR rendered a decision on November 11, 1955, granting the company the right to reorganize (finding the business was losing), dismissing the overtime compensation demand (for lack of proof of actual overtime work), granting only 12 days of sick leave with pay per year, denying vacation leave (due to the company’s financial standing), ordering compliance with free dental service laws, and denying the demands for union recognition as sole bargaining agency and for the reinstatement of Graciano Martinez to his former post. The Union’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CIR in banc on December 29, 1955, though it was modified to grant one month separation pay to union members not yet readmitted, subject to refund upon readmission. The Union appealed to the Supreme Court via certiorari, alleging the CIR committed grave abuse of discretion in its evaluation of evidence and erred in deciding on demands not covered during the hearings.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations regarding the denial of overtime pay and the grant of the company’s right to reorganize.
2. Whether the Court of Industrial Relations erred in deciding on all the union’s demands when, according to the union, the hearings were limited only to the issues of reorganization and overtime compensation.

RULING

1. No, the Supreme Court cannot review the factual findings. The issues raised by the petitioner concerning the appreciation of evidence are purely factual questions. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (as amended) and Section 2 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is precluded from reviewing the correctness of the CIR’s findings of fact as long as there is evidence to support them. The Court cited precedents (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa; Philippine Newspaper Guild vs. Evening News, Inc.; Isaac Peral Bowling Alley vs. United Employees’ Welfare Association) affirming that it is not empowered to revoke a CIR decision merely because it is not based on overwhelming evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to discuss the CIR’s holdings on overtime compensation and the alleged unfair labor practice related to the reorganization.
2. No, the Court of Industrial Relations did not err in deciding on all demands. The Supreme Court sustained the CIR’s action. The records showed no understanding or agreement that the hearings and submission of the case were limited only to the issues of reorganization and overtime compensation. When the parties rested their case and submitted it for decision, it was understood to cover all issues involved unless specifically agreed otherwise. Furthermore, under Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (as amended), the CIR is authorized to include in its decision any matter deemed necessary for the settlement of an industrial dispute, even if not specifically claimed. Thus, the CIR was acting within its powers in disposing of all the demands in the union’s petition.
DISPOSITIVE:
The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated November 11, 1955, and its resolution of December 29, 1955, are hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
CONCURRING OPINION:
Justice J.B.L. Reyes concurred except as to the refund provision for the separation pay.