GR 98118; (December, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 98118 , December 6, 1991
HON. PETE NICOMEDES PRADO, ATTY. JUAN C. STA. ANA, and the PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. HON REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, PORT AREA REALTY, INC., EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, HARBOR IMPORT SHOPPING CENTER, ORIENTAL MEDIA, INC. and ESTER CALING LIM, respondents.
FACTS
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) sought to lease Block 145 at the Port Area, Manila, after the original lease of S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc. (SVEI) was cancelled by the government. SVEI’s appeal was denied by the Office of the President. PPA published an invitation to bid for the lease and development of the block. Private respondents, claiming to be sublessees and occupants of the commercial complex on Block 145, filed a petition for Specific Performance with a prayer for a preliminary injunction to stop the bidding. They argued the bidding was discriminatory and deprived them of property rights without due process. The case was assigned to Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila presided by respondent Judge.
On November 28, 1990, the respondent judge issued a 20-day temporary restraining order (TRO) ex parte, based on an unverified motion, halting the bidding. After the TRO lapsed, the judge issued a “status quo order” on April 15, 1991, which effectively continued to restrain PPA from proceeding with the lease and development of the property. Petitioners assailed this order for having been issued without a hearing and without the requisite bond from the private respondents.
ISSUE
May a court validly issue ex parte a “status quo order” that operates as a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction based on an unverified motion and without a hearing?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the status quo order as null and void. The Court emphasized that a preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy that should only be issued after a hearing and upon the posting of a bond by the applicant, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The respondent judge’s “status quo order” was, in substance and effect, a preliminary injunction, as it indefinitely restrained the PPA from leasing the property. It was issued without the required judicial discretion exercised after a hearing where both parties could present evidence on the necessity for the writ.
The Court ruled that the earlier 20-day TRO had automatically expired and could not be revived or extended through a “status quo order.” The issuance of such an order based merely on an unverified motion circumvented the procedural safeguards established to prevent the improvident grant of injunctive relief. The law strictly requires a hearing for a preliminary injunction to protect the rights of all parties, ensuring the order is not issued capriciously or arbitrarily. Therefore, the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.