GR 98028; (January, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 98028. January 27, 1992. GREGORIO CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTO IGNACIO, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Alberto Ignacio filed a complaint for injunction against petitioner Gregorio Castillo before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Ignacio alleged he was the agricultural tenant of Castillo’s 9,920-square-meter land planted with fruit-bearing trees in Pulilan, Bulacan. He claimed that after agreeing, via a “Kasunduan,” to allow Castillo to construct a resthouse, Castillo violated the agreement by cutting trees and filling with adobe the area where Ignacio planted vegetables. He sought a writ of preliminary injunction, which was granted. Castillo countered that Ignacio was not a tenant but merely a “magsisiga” (smudger) hired to smoke the mango trees to induce flowering. He asserted his ownership rights, denied needing permission to build, and explained the “Kasunduan” was prepared by a MAR lawyer who assured him it did not create a tenancy relationship as there was “nothing to cultivate.”
The RTC dismissed the complaint, finding no tenancy relationship existed and lifting the injunction. It also ordered Ignacio to pay attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, declared the existence of a tenancy relationship, and permanently enjoined Castillo from disturbing Ignacio’s possession. Castillo elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between Gregorio Castillo and Alberto Ignacio.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that no tenancy relationship exists. It reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC decision, with the modification of deleting the award of attorney’s fees. The Court reiterated the essential requisites of agricultural tenancy under the law: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is consideration consisting of harvest sharing; (5) the landowner’s consent; and (6) the tenant’s personal cultivation. All requisites must concur.
The Court found the evidence insufficient to establish several elements. Regarding consent, the “Kasunduan” was not conclusive proof, and there was no concrete evidence to establish this element. Crucially, the element of personal cultivation was absent. The Court cited De los Reyes v. Espineli, holding that absent personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if designated as such in an agreement. Ignacio’s role as a “magsisiga” did not constitute the personal cultivation required by law. On the element of harvest sharing, the receipt presented was inadmissible against Castillo as he did not participate in its execution, applying the rule that a party cannot be prejudiced by the act of another. The Court also cited Caballes v. DAR, stating that the fact of sharing alone is insufficient to establish tenancy. Since not all requisites were present, Ignacio was not a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure. However, the award of attorney’s fees was deleted as the action was filed in good faith.
