GR 97332; (October, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 97332 October 10, 1991
SPOUSES JULIO D. VILLAMOR AND MARINA VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MACARIA LABINGISA REYES AND ROBERTO REYES, respondents.
FACTS
Macaria Labingisa Reyes owned a 600-square meter lot. In July 1971, she sold half (300 sq.m.) to spouses Julio and Marina Villamor. On November 11, 1971, Macaria, with her husband’s conformity, executed a “Deed of Option” in favor of the Villamors. This document stipulated that the remaining 300-square meter portion would be sold to the Villamors at the same price of P70.00 per square meter, “whenever the need of such sale arises, either on our part or on the part of the spouses.” The Villamors accepted these terms within the same instrument.
In 1984, upon her husband’s retirement, Macaria offered to repurchase the initially sold portion, but the Villamors refused and instead invoked the Deed of Option to demand purchase of the remaining lot. The Reyeses ignored this demand. After failed barangay conciliation, the Villamors filed a complaint for specific performance on July 13, 1987. The Regional Trial Court ruled in their favor, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners’ action to enforce the Deed of Option is barred by prescription and laches.
RULING
Yes, the action is barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Deed of Option created a reciprocal obligation where either party could demand performance. However, it lacked a specific period for such demand, rendering the obligation’s duration uncertain. Under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
The Court ruled that the right of action accrued upon the execution of the contract on November 11, 1971, as the acceptance was incorporated therein, making it a perfected bilateral promise. The Villamors filed their complaint only on July 13, 1987, or nearly seventeen years later, which is beyond the ten-year prescriptive period. Their claim of having made a demand in 1984 was still untimely, as it was made thirteen years after the contract’s execution. The prolonged inaction constituted laches, prejudicing the respondents. Furthermore, enforcing the 1971 price amidst Metro Manila’s continuously rising real estate values would be grossly inequitable, especially considering the Reyeses’ need for the property as their residence. The petition was denied.