G.R. No. 96803 February 17, 1993
HEIRS OF THE LATE FRANCISCO ABUEG, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION) AND JOSELITO ORAÑA, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Joselito Oraña was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property after his motorcycle bumped and killed Francisco Abueg on February 9, 1988. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City found him guilty and sentenced him to four years and two months of imprisonment, plus payment of damages to the victim’s heirs. On September 19, 1989, Oraña filed an application for probation. The probation officers recommended granting probation for six years. However, the trial court denied the application on January 16, 1990, and also denied his motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1990. Oraña was committed to prison on May 4, 1990. On March 27, 1990, he filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction and restraining order with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court issued a temporary restraining order on May 8, 1990, enjoining enforcement of the imprisonment sentence, and later rendered a decision on July 10, 1990, setting aside the trial court’s orders denying probation and directing the trial court to give due course to the probation application and release Oraña under his original bail bond. The heirs of Francisco Abueg (petitioners) challenged the appellate court’s resolution and decision, arguing that the trial court’s orders had become final and executory and that Oraña was already serving his sentence.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) restraining the enforcement of the imprisonment sentence; (2) granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside the trial court’s orders denying probation; and (3) directing the trial court to give due course to the application for probation.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
1. On the restraining order: The Court held that the trial court’s judgment of conviction became final upon the filing of the application for probation, as this constituted a waiver of the right to appeal under the Probation Law. However, the judgment was not executory pending resolution of the probation application. The denial of probation did not become final and executory because, under the Rules on Probation, such an order is not appealable. Thus, the special civil action of certiorari was the appropriate remedy. The appellate court’s temporary restraining order was valid to preserve the status quo and prevent the case from becoming moot and academic, as it enjoined the continuance of Oraña’s imprisonment.
2. On the grant of certiorari and setting aside of the trial court’s orders: The Court found that the petitioners’ arguments on the finality of the trial court’s orders were inapplicable. The filing of the certiorari petition interrupted the finality of the denial of probation. The appellate court acted within its jurisdiction in reviewing the trial court’s orders for grave abuse of discretion.
3. On directing the trial court to give due course to the probation application: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the appellate court’s directive. The petitioners’ opposition to probation was based on generalities and unsupported allegations, while the probation officers’ comprehensive report recommended granting probation. The Court clarified that probation is a less costly alternative to imprisonment and does not release the offender from civil liabilities; instead, it enables the offender to secure a stable job to pay such liabilities. The appellate court’s decision was consistent with the philosophy and objectives of the Probation Law.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.