G.R. No. 95136 October 3, 1991
RAFAEL BAYLOSIS and BENJAMIN DE VERA, petitioners, vs. HON. APOLONIO R. CHAVEZ, JR., et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, along with Marco Palo, were charged before the Regional Trial Court with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866. The information alleged that they, as high-ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, unlawfully possessed an AK-47 rifle and hand grenades “in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion.” They filed a motion to quash the information, contending that the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for such qualified illegal possession of firearms, is unconstitutional.
The trial court denied their motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioners thus filed this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. They argued that the challenged provision violates constitutional guarantees, including due process, equal protection, and protection against double jeopardy. Their core contention was that the doctrine established in People vs. Hernandez—that common crimes are absorbed by the crime of rebellion—renders the subsequent statutory provision unconstitutional for effectively creating a complex crime of rebellion with illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE

Whether or not the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms committed in furtherance of or in connection with rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, is unconstitutional.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the challenged provision and denied the petition. The Court ruled that the Hernandez doctrine, which prohibits the complexing of common crimes with rebellion under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is a judicial construction of specific penal code provisions. It does not possess the force of a constitutional mandate that can invalidate a subsequent, separate legislative enactment. P.D. 1866 creates a distinct, substantive offense of qualified illegal possession of firearms, defined by the specific intent that the firearms are used in furtherance of rebellion or subversion. This is a separate offense from simple rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
The legislature, in its wisdom, may define and punish specific acts that threaten public order. The provision under attack is a valid exercise of this police power, intended to address the grave perils posed by the use of firearms in pursuit of rebellion. It does not constitute a bill of attainder, as it punishes a defined act, not a specific person or group. Nor does it violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, as a single act may give rise to multiple liabilities under different statutes if the laws protect separate and distinct interests. The Court found no constitutional infirmity, reiterating its earlier ruling in Misolas vs. Panga, which repelled identical arguments.