GR 93891; (March, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
The Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) issued an ex parte cease and desist order on September 22, 1988, directing Solar Textile Finishing Corporation to immediately stop utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. The order was based on multiple inspections conducted in 1986 and 1988, which found Solar’s wastewater treatment plant non-operational and discharging highly pollutive, untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, in violation of P.D. No. 984 and its regulations. Solar received the order on September 26, 1988, and a subsequent writ of execution on March 31, 1989.
Instead of seeking a public hearing before the PAB to contest the order’s factual basis, Solar filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, arguing a denial of due process. The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy and that the case was mooted by a subsequent PAB order allowing temporary operation pending another inspection. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding certiorari was proper due to potential irreparable injury and to settle due process issues, and declared the writ of execution null and void.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s dismissal of Solar’s certiorari petition, specifically on the grounds that the PAB’s ex parte cease and desist order and writ of execution violated due process and were proper subjects of certiorari.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC’s order of dismissal. The Court held that the PAB’s ex parte order and writ of execution were issued in accordance with its explicit statutory authority under Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984. This provision empowers the Board to issue such orders summarily when there is prima facie evidence of pollution, posing an immediate threat to life, public health, safety, or welfare, or to the environment. The statutory scheme contemplates immediate action to abate a pressing danger, with a full public hearing to follow where the affected party can contest the order’s factual basis.
The legal logic is that due process in this administrative context is satisfied not by a prior hearing, but by the subsequent opportunity for a hearing. The exigent nature of pollution control, where delay could cause irreversible harm, justifies the ex parte issuance. Solar’s proper recourse was not a judicial certiorari proceeding but to avail itself of the public hearing before the PAB. Since the Board’s acts were within its lawful authority, they were not patent nullities, making certiorari an improper remedy. The subsequent availability of a hearing before the PAB fulfills constitutional due process requirements. The Supreme Court thus reinstated the PAB’s orders and the RTC’s dismissal, without prejudice to Solar’s right to a public hearing before the Board.
