GR 91626; (October, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 91626 October 3, 1991
FRANKLIN DRILON, et al., petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO GANZON, and RAUL PAREDES, respondents.
FACTS
In 1973, respondents Rodolfo Ganzon and Raul Paredes were charged with double murder before Military Commission No. 34. The Commission acquitted Paredes but convicted Ganzon, sentencing him to life imprisonment. Ganzon served his sentence until his release in 1978, after which he was placed under house arrest. In 1988, following an administrative change, the Secretary of Justice directed a new preliminary investigation against both respondents for the same murders. The respondents moved to dismiss: Ganzon claimed he had been granted an absolute pardon by President Marcos, and Paredes invoked his prior acquittal. The investigating fiscal denied their motions.
The respondents then filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals to halt the new criminal proceedings. The appellate court granted the petition, permanently enjoining the filing of new informations. It ruled that subjecting the respondents to another trial would be unjust, drawing analogy from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cruz v. Enrile, which shielded civilians from reprosecution for cases already terminated by military commissions. The Court of Appeals also found that Ganzon had sufficiently proven the grant of presidential pardon.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in prohibiting the Department of Justice from filing new criminal informations against the respondents based on the doctrines of double jeopardy and presidential pardon.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, denying the petition. The legal logic rests on the conclusive effects of the prior military commission proceedings, despite their inherent jurisdictional voidness as established in Cruz v. Enrile. For Paredes, the principle of double jeopardy applies. His acquittal by the military commission, though jurisdictionally flawed, constitutes a final verdict that bars a second prosecution for the same offense. To retry him would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
For Ganzon, the Court found it unnecessary to definitively rule on the validity of the alleged presidential pardon. The core reasoning is that his conviction and service of sentence under the military commission must be given legal effect as a fait accompli. Following the precedent in Cruz, civilians who have been convicted and have served their sentences by these void tribunals cannot be subjected to a new trial. The loss of liberty suffered cannot be restored, and reprosecution would be a profound injustice. The Court emphasized that while the military commissions lacked jurisdiction, their judgments, once carried out, produce legal consequences that civilian courts must respect to prevent endless persecution. Thus, the prohibition against new filings was proper.
