GR 91500; (October, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 91500 October 18, 1990
ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 3001 in 1960 to construct, maintain, and operate radio broadcasting stations. It successfully established ten stations nationwide. In 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A was issued, imposing ownership limitations (e.g., no more than five AM/FM stations nationwide) and mandating divestiture of excess stations by December 31, 1981. Section 6 of the Decree further provided that all existing franchises or authorities to operate would terminate on that same date, after which new authority must be secured from the regulatory board.
Petitioner complied with the Decree by divesting itself of several stations, retaining only three. Years later, in 1990, it filed this petition, seeking a declaration that PD 576-A is unconstitutional. It argued the Decree effected a taking of property without due process and just compensation, impaired its franchise contract with the state, violated freedom of speech and the press, and constituted an unlawful restraint of trade.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court can properly exercise its power of judicial review to rule on the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition, declining to rule on the constitutional challenges. The Court anchored its dismissal on the doctrine of justiciability and the prematurity of the petition. The core legal logic is that judicial power requires an actual, concrete case or controversy where the constitutional question is raised at the earliest opportunity and is essential to the resolution of a genuine dispute.
The Court found no such justiciable case presented. Petitioner had voluntarily complied with PD 576-A by divesting its excess stations years earlier, in 1981, without any contemporaneous protest or challenge. By acquiescing to and abiding by the law’s terms for nearly a decade, petitioner was estopped from belatedly attacking its validity. The principle that “one who sleeps on his rights shall not be heard to complain” barred the claim. Furthermore, the petition was procedurally improper. It could not be treated as a petition for prohibition, as it did not seek to halt any ongoing judicial or ministerial proceedings; instead, it sought the affirmative remedy of reinstating rights under a repealed franchise based on a hypothetical future denial of an application. Since no actual, present governmental action was being contested, the petition was premature and presented no live controversy appropriate for judicial resolution.