G.R. No. 91391 ; January 24, 1991
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

FACTS

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and assisted by Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages against Juan Ponce Enrile and others before the Sandiganbayan. After his motion to dismiss was denied, Enrile filed an answer containing a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim. He later sought and was granted leave by the Sandiganbayan to implead Solicitor General Chavez and several PCGG officials as additional party defendants to his counterclaim. Enrile specifically alleged that these officials, with malice and evident bad faith, filed a baseless “harassment suit” against him despite a prior PCGG finding clearing him of any involvement.
Instead of filing an answer to the counterclaim, Solicitor General Chavez filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court, challenging the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions. He argued that the counterclaim was improperly directed against him in his capacity as counsel for the Republic, not as a party to the original suit. The Sandiganbayan, in its assailed resolutions, had granted Enrile’s motion to implead and later denied motions for reconsideration, holding the resolution of defenses in the counterclaim in abeyance pending trial.

ISSUE

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the impleading of the Solicitor General as an additional party defendant to the compulsory counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions. The Court ruled that a counterclaim cannot be properly filed against a lawyer, such as the Solicitor General, who acts solely as counsel for a party in the litigation. Citing Borja v. Borja, the Court emphasized that a lawyer’s appearance and participation in a case on behalf of a client does not make the lawyer a party to the action. The lawyer represents the client’s interests and is not personally liable for, or entitled to, any adjudication made between the principal parties, save for professional fees.
The Court acknowledged that a claim for damages arising from a maliciously filed suit can be a compulsory counterclaim, as held in Tiu Po v. Bautista. However, that principle applies to claims against the opposing party, not against that party’s counsel. To allow a counterclaim against the counsel in the very case he is handling would lead to mischievous consequences, undermining the lawyer’s duty of entire devotion to the client’s cause. This is particularly critical for the Solicitor General, who must often prosecute controversial cases in the national interest without the distraction of defending himself in the same proceeding. The proper remedy for Enrile’s allegations of malice and bad faith is a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the officials concerned, not a counterclaim in the case where the Solicitor General appears only as counsel.